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Abstract
Pirates are literally getting away with murder. Modern pirates are attacking vessels, hijacking
ships at gunpoint, taking hostages, and injuring and killing crew members.1 They are doing so with
increasing frequency. According to the International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) Piracy Reporting
Center’s 2009 Annual Report, there were 406 pirate attacks in 2009—a number that has not been
reached since 2003. Yet, in most instances, a culture of impunity reigns whereby nations are not
holding pirates accountable for the violent crimes they commit. Only a small portion of those
people committing piracy are actually captured and brought to trial, as opposed to captured and
released. For example, in September 2008, a Danish warship captured ten Somali pirates, but then
later released them on a Somali beach, even though the pirates were found with assault weapons
and notes stating how they would split their piracy proceeds with warlords on land. Britain’s Royal
Navy has been accused of releasing suspected pirates,7 as have Canadian naval forces. Only very
recently, Russia released captured Somali pirates—after a high-seas shootout between Russian
marines and pirates that had attacked a tanker carrying twenty-three crew and US$52 million
worth of oil.9 In May 2010, the United States released ten captured pirates it had been holding for
weeks after concluding that its search for a nation to prosecute them was futile. In fact, between
March and April 2010, European Union (“EU”) naval forces captured 275 alleged pirates, but
only forty face prosecution. Furthermore, when pirates are tried, they are often tried by Kenya
or other African nations, rather than by the capturing nation. Kenya has entered into agreements
with Canada, China, Denmark, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States
to try the pirates these nations capture. Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania have executed similar
agreements to prosecute captured pirates. In an effort to aid prosecutions, Western states have
pledged money—about US $10 million since May 2009—to alleviate the strain on the “poorly
equipped and corrupt criminal justice system” and to cover the cost of transporting witnesses,
training police and prosecutors, and upgrading prisons and courts.16 In fact, in late June 2010,
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (“UNODC”) used funds from donor nations to
help open a new high-security courtroom in Mombasa, Kenya to prosecute pirates.17 But why
are Western states refusing to prosecute pirates on their own soil even though they—more so than
less-developed nations—have the money and institutional capabilities to bring pirates to justice
in a swift and fair manner? After all, these states are providing Kenya and other African nations
with funds and support to help them conduct piracy trials. They are spending billions to support
the various naval patrols that are capturing pirates—but thereafter releasing them to continue their
criminal activities. While several reasons have been advanced to explain why nations may not be

regularly prosecuting pirates, one reason often given to explain the reluctance of Western nations
to try pirates on their own soil is the threat of asylum claims by convicted pirates. This reason has
been advanced by academics and government representatives, among others. Roger Middleton,
a researcher for Chatham House, the London-based think tank, explained it this way: “These
countries don’t want to be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would ask not
to be deported to Somalia, a country at war.” In fact, in April 2008, the British Foreign Office
warned the Royal Navy that detaining pirates at sea could be a violation of their human rights and
could also lead to asylum claims by pirates seeking to relocate to Europe. A former Tory chairman
stated that ministers in Parliament had indicated privately that the reason captured pirates were not
being brought to Britain for trial (including the sixty-six suspected pirates captured by the Royal
Navy in 2009—all of whom were thereafter released) was because of fears those pirates might
seek asylum in the country. And at least some pirates have actually threatened to seek asylum
in theWest. Reports indicate that two of the pirates on trial for attacking a Dutch vessel have
declared their intention to try to stay on as residents. Nevertheless, although the threat of asylum
claims is frequently offered to explain Western nations’ reluctance to prosecute pirates in their
territories, what is not addressed is whether this fear has any actual basis in fact or law. Instead,
the statement that nations are afraid of asylum claims is followed by little explanation at all—and
certainly no legal analysis of the international or domestic laws on which convicted pirates would
base their claims for asylum. In any event, even if the fear of asylum claims is well-founded, is this
a reason to allow Western nations to avoid their duty to prosecute crimes that violate international
law? Although some pirates are being prosecuted, why should others get away with murder solely
because Western nations fear asylum claims? This Article is concerned with these issues and
examines international refugee law and international human rights law in an effort to determine the
likely viability of any asylum claims that may be brought by pirates convicted in the West. Based
on an analysis of the text of the main international treaties governing asylum and non-refoulement,
as well as interpretations of the provisions contained in those treaties, this Article concludes there
is little reason to believe that Western states would be required to grant refugee status (as that term
is defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) to convicted pirates. Among
other things, pirates are not a group that is subject to persecution, and pirates have committed the
types of serious and violent crimes that should exclude them from claiming refugee status—and
thus, the residence and other benefits associated with being granted asylum. Second, states should
be able to legally expel or deport convicted pirates under international human rights treaties since
most pirates are likely unable to show they would face torture if expelled or returned to their
country of origin. Even if pirates could show they risk torture or other inhumane treatment upon
return, states may be able to satisfy their international obligations regarding non-refoulement and
return pirates if the state receives diplomatic assurances that the authorities would not resort to
such treatment. Furthermore, under the recent European Qualitative Directive, European Union
Member States are not required to grant benefits such as residence permits to individuals who have
committed serious and violent crimes, even though the European Convention on Human Rights
prohibits refoulement to face torture or other ill treatment. Finally, even if there is some risk
that some pirates can mount successful asylum or non-refoulement claims, the risk is one that
developed Western states should assume because of the greater good that will come from ensuring
that pirates are brought to justice (especially by way of fair trials and processes that respect human
rights).26 Developed nations risk asylum claims (by pirates and others) simply because they are
developed—a status that typically carries with it an expectation that the state will protect human

rights and enforce the rule of law. In this instance, enforcing the rule of law means that nations
must invoke universal jurisdiction or use the prohibitions contained in international treaties and
in their own domestic laws to prosecute violent and dangerous pirates even if it means they must
consider and adjudicate some additional asylum claims. Bringing to justice the pirates that commit
violent acts and disrupt international waters is a goal as worthy as numerous others where nations
accept the risk of asylum claims, and pirates are unlikely to be deterred from committing those
acts unless nations commit to end the current culture of impunity. Part I of this Article describes
the modern piracy problem, including the international law governing piracy, and the culture of
impunity that surrounds it. Part II provides a brief overview of the international law providing
protection for those seeking asylum, focusing on international refugee law as well as the primary
treaties under international human rights law that govern the transfer of persons and specifically
prohibit transfer to states where those persons would be subjected to torture or ill treatment. Parts
III and IV analyze international refugee law and international human rights law in the context
of potential claims by convicted pirates seeking asylum and protection against nonrefoulement.
The Article concludes by suggesting that although prosecuting pirates may require states to also
consider additional asylum claims, the risk that states will have to grant such claims is small and
also a burden they should assume so that pirates may be brought to justice.

PIRATES AND IMPUNITY: IS THE THREAT OF
ASYLUM CLAIMS A REASON TO ALLOW PIRATES
TO ESCAPE JUSTICE?
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INTRODUCTION
Pirates are literally getting away with murder. Modern
pirates are attacking vessels, hijacking ships at gunpoint, taking
hostages, and injuring and killing crew members.1 They are
doing so with increasing frequency. According to the
International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) Piracy Reporting
Center’s 2009 Annual Report, there were 406 pirate attacks in
20092—a number that has not been reached since 2003.3 Yet, in
most instances, a culture of impunity reigns whereby nations are
not holding pirates accountable for the violent crimes they
commit.4
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1. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU,
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT 5–6, 12, 25 (2010)
[hereinafter ICC-IMB].
2. Id. at 2. For purposes of gathering its statistics, the International Maritime
Bureau (“IMB”) reports acts of piracy and armed robbery that it defines as follows: “An
act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit
theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act.” Id. at 3. It is important to note that the IMB tracks only those
incidents that are reported. The true number of actual and attempted pirate attacks
could be much higher, as it is generally believed that many ship owners do not report
attacks for fear their ships will be delayed during an investigation or that their insurance
premiums may rise. See JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND
TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 181 (2003); PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: TERRORISM, PIRACY, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED
STATES 7 (2008).
3. ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 5–6, 25.
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST,
PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT 31 (2008) [hereinafter PIRACY OFF THE
SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT]; Drew H. Pearson, Can the Somali Pirates Be Stopped?, 42
SEA CLASSICS 14, 20 (2009); Fernando Peinado Alcaraz, Chasing Pirates is All Very Well—
But Who is Going to Lock Them Up?, EL PAIS, Aug. 17, 2009, at 4; Mike Corder, Nations Look
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Only a small portion of those people committing piracy are
actually captured and brought to trial, as opposed to captured
and released.5 For example, in September 2008, a Danish warship
captured ten Somali pirates, but then later released them on a
Somali beach, even though the pirates were found with assault
weapons and notes stating how they would split their piracy
proceeds with warlords on land.6 Britain’s Royal Navy has been
accused of releasing suspected pirates,7 as have Canadian naval
forces.8 Only very recently, Russia released captured Somali
pirates—after a high-seas shootout between Russian marines and
pirates that had attacked a tanker carrying twenty-three crew and
US$52 million worth of oil.9 In May 2010, the United States
released ten captured pirates it had been holding for weeks after
concluding that its search for a nation to prosecute them was

to Kenya as Venue for Piracy Trials, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009073898_apeu
prosecutingpirates.html; Mariama Diallo, Nations Prove More Willing to Combat Piracy than
Prosecuting Pirate Suspects, VOICE OF AMERICA, June 9, 2010, available at
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Nations-Prove-More-Willing-toCombat-Piracy-than-Prosecuting-Pirate-Suspects-95861284.html; Eric Ellen, Bringing
Piracy to Account, JANE’S NAVY INT’L, Apr. 1997, at 29; John Knott, United Kingdom:
Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and Piracy: An Overview, and Recent Developments, MONDAQ, Apr.
15, 2009, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=72910; Henry
Ridgwell, Alleged Somali Pirates Face Trial in Europe, VOICE OF AMERICA, June 9, 2010,
available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Alleged-Somali-PiratesFace-Trial-in-Europe-95985709.html; Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge
for Foreign Navies Who Catch Somali Pirates, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A8.
5. See International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm.
on Int’l Org., Human Rights, and Oversight, 111th Cong. 4, 6 (2009) (statement of Rear
Admiral William Baumgartner) (explaining that most pirates literally “get away” with
their illegal conduct and that even when pirates are caught in the act and apprehended,
they are more typically released and permitted to continue their illegal activities, rather
than being brought to justice).
6. See Paulo Prada & Alex Roth, On the Lawless Seas, It’s Not Easy Putting Somali
Pirates in the Dock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A16; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates
Outmaneuver Warships off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A6 (reporting that both
Danish and American navies had been releasing suspected pirates).
7. See Jason Groves, Navy Gives Somali Pirates Food and Water . . . Then Lets Them Sail
Jan.
28,
2010,
available
at
off
Scot
Free, DAILY MAIL (London),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1246300/Navy-gives-pirates-food-water--letssail-scot-free.html.
8. See Canadian Warship Helps Vessel Evade Pirates, CTV NEWS, May 22, 2009,
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20090522/cdn_warship_090522.
9. See Ellen Barry, Russia Frees Somali Pirates It Had Seized in Shootout, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2010, at A4.
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futile.10 In fact, between March and April 2010, European Union
(“EU”) naval forces captured 275 alleged pirates, but only forty
face prosecution.11
Furthermore, when pirates are tried, they are often tried by
Kenya or other African nations, rather than by the capturing
nation.12 Kenya has entered into agreements with Canada, China,
Denmark, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States to try the pirates these nations capture.13 Mauritius,
Seychelles, and Tanzania have executed similar agreements to
prosecute captured pirates.14 In an effort to aid prosecutions,
Western states have pledged money—about US$10 million since
May 200915—to alleviate the strain on the “poorly equipped and
10. See Craig Whitlock, Navy Releases Accused Somali Pirates Held on Warship for Six
Weeks, WASH. POST, May 29, 2010, at A10; see also Michael Scott Moore, How Do You
Prosecute a Pirate?, MILLER-MCCUNE, Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://www.millermccune.com/politics/how-do-you-prosecute-a-pirate-6181; Mayport-Based Destroyer Sinks
Pirate Mothership, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 3, 2010, at B-5.
11. See Diallo, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., U.S. Navy Hands over 17 Pirates to Kenya, REUTERS, June 10, 2009,
available at http://af.reuters.com/article/djiboutiNews/idAFLA105255820090610.
13. See, e.g., Derek Kilner, Kenya, US Agree to Deal on Piracy, NORTH DENVER NEWS,
Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://northdenvernews.com/content/view/1719/2;
Alphonce Shindu, AG Queried over Kenya’s Role on Piracy Cases, DAILY NATION (Nairobi),
Mar. 30, 2010, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/AG%20queried%
20over%20Kenya%20role%20in%20piracy%20cases/-/1056/889516/-/l96m63/-/index.
html; Claire Wanja, Kenya-China to Sign MOU on Anti-Piracy, KENYA BROAD. CORP., Mar. 4,
2009, available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=55949; see also Council Decision
No. 2009/293/CFSP, 2009 O.J. L 79/47, at 47 (concerning the Exchange of Letters
between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the conditions and
modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and
detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in
the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after
such transfer).
14. See Jean Paul Arouff, Mauritius Says Ready to Try, Imprison Pirates, REUTERS, June
12, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65B021; Diallo, supra
note 4 (stating that Seychelles recently began prosecuting pirates, setting up a special
court to hear some thirty-one cases); Daniel Richey, Mauritius to Try Accused Somali
Pirates, JURIST, June 13, 2010, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/mauritius-to-tryaccused-somali-pirates.php; see also Council Decision No. 2009/877/CFSP, 2009 O.J. L
315/35, at 35 (discussing the signing and provisional application of the Exchange of
Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on the conditions
and modalities for the transfer of suspected pirates and armed robbers from
EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for their treatment after such transfer);
Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles, 2009
O.J. L 315/37.
15. EU Pledges More Support to Kenya for Piracy Trials, KENYA BROAD. CORP., July 28,
2010, available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=65581 (noting that Australia,
Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, and the United States pledged more
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corrupt criminal justice system” and to cover the cost of
transporting witnesses, training police and prosecutors, and
upgrading prisons and courts.16 In fact, in late June 2010, the
United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (“UNODC”) used
funds from donor nations to help open a new high-security
courtroom in Mombasa, Kenya to prosecute pirates.17
But why are Western states refusing to prosecute pirates on
their own soil even though they—more so than less-developed
nations—have the money and institutional capabilities to bring
pirates to justice in a swift and fair manner? After all, these states
are providing Kenya and other African nations with funds and
support to help them conduct piracy trials. They are spending
billions to support the various naval patrols that are capturing
pirates—but thereafter releasing them to continue their criminal
activities.18 While several reasons have been advanced to explain
why nations may not be regularly prosecuting pirates,19 one
than US$10 million to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”)
program, which gives aid to other states in East Africa for the prosecution of piracy
cases).
16. Tom Maliti, UN: Donors to Give US$9.3M on Somali Piracy Cases, ABC NEWS, June
15, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=10916654.
17. UN and Kenya Open Courtroom to Prosecute Pirates in Mombasa Port, WIRE UPDATE
NEWS, June 26, 2010, available at http://wireupdate.com/wires/6943/un-and-kenyaopen-courtroom-to-prosecute-pirates-in-mombasa-port.
18. See, e.g., Antonio Maria Costa, The War on Piracy Must Start on Land, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., June 9, 2010, at 8 (explaining that one vessel patrolling off the coast of
Somalia costs US$100,000 per day and there are more than forty vessels on patrol,
suggesting an annual operational cost of about US$1.5 billion); David Gauvey Herbert,
Piracy Is Down, and Moving Farther Out, BURN AFTER READING, Apr. 21, 2010, available at
http://burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/04/piracy-is-down-and-why-thatsb.php (noting that EU, NATO, and US naval forces cost just less than US$1.9 billion per
year to support).
19. See, e.g., James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the
Red Sea, 28 COMP. STRATEGY 197, 207 (2009) (emphasizing the logistical difficulties
associated with prosecuting pirates because the cases involve suspects from one country,
witnesses and victims from other countries, and vessels that are registered in or carrying
cargo from other countries). The other reasons typically cited to explain why nations are
not willing to prosecute pirates do not seem applicable to Western and other developed
nations. For example, commentators cite to the lack of institutional capacity to handle
the cost and difficulty of piracy claims that may involve victims and witnesses from
various states. Id. But, while pirate trials are necessarily costly as they involve witnesses
and evidence from various countries, these are costs and difficulties that developed
nations should be able to handle—even though they may not have the political will to do
so. But c.f. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti
Code and the Somali Coast Guard, 52 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 516, 516 (2009) (noting
that captured pirates cannot be turned over to local authorities in Somalia because the
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reason often given to explain the reluctance of Western nations
to try pirates on their own soil is the threat of asylum claims by
convicted pirates.20 This reason has been advanced by academics
and government representatives, among others.21 Roger
Middleton, a researcher for Chatham House, the London-based
think tank, explained it this way: “These countries don’t want to
be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would
ask not to be deported to Somalia, a country at war.”22 In fact, in
April 2008, the British Foreign Office warned the Royal Navy that
detaining pirates at sea could be a violation of their human rights
and could also lead to asylum claims by pirates seeking to
relocate to Europe.23 A former Tory chairman stated that
ministers in Parliament had indicated privately that the reason
captured pirates were not being brought to Britain for trial
(including the sixty-six suspected pirates captured by the Royal
Navy in 2009—all of whom were thereafter released) was because
of fears those pirates might seek asylum in the country.24 And at
least some pirates have actually threatened to seek asylum in the
West. Reports indicate that two of the pirates on trial for
failed state generally has no responsible authorities); DIETER BERG ET AL., KNOWLEDGE
SERIES: PIRACY—THREAT AT SEA: A RISK ANALYSIS 29 (2009) (suggesting that many
nations close to the territory where acts of piracy are typically committed do not have
the security, enforcement, and financial resources to catch and prosecute pirates). In
addition, while the absence of national laws criminalizing piracy is also cited to explain
the lack of prosecutions, piracy is subject to universal jurisdiction, and most nations are
parties to the international treaties criminalizing piracy, which require them to
implement national legislation. See infra Part I.B. Furthermore, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States have brought charges against several suspected
pirates, indicating that at least some developed nations do have the institutional capacity
and necessary laws to allow them to prosecute pirates—if they also have the political will.
See infra note 81.
20. See Jean Paul Arouff, Mauritian Leader Says Country Is Ready to Tackle Piracy,
SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), June 13, 2010, at 35; see also, e.g., Mohammed Abbas, EU
Anti-Piracy Force Urges More Prosecutions, DAILY STAR (Beirut), Apr. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=113367.
21. For example, at a workshop of international law experts and judges sponsored
by the Academic Council on the United Nations System, the American Society of
International Law, and the One Earth Future Foundation, many commented that the
threat of asylum concerns was a reason why Western states are not eager to prosecute
pirates in their territories. See ELIZABETH ANDERSEN ET AL., SUPPRESSING MARITIME
PIRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6–8 (2009).
22. See Alcaraz, supra note 4.
23. See Africa Politics: Combating Piracy, VIEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 2884026.
24. See Groves, supra note 7.
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attacking a Dutch vessel have declared their intention to try to
stay on as residents.25
Nevertheless, although the threat of asylum claims is
frequently offered to explain Western nations’ reluctance to
prosecute pirates in their territories, what is not addressed is
whether this fear has any actual basis in fact or law. Instead, the
statement that nations are afraid of asylum claims is followed by
little explanation at all—and certainly no legal analysis of the
international or domestic laws on which convicted pirates would
base their claims for asylum. In any event, even if the fear of
asylum claims is well-founded, is this a reason to allow Western
nations to avoid their duty to prosecute crimes that violate
international law? Although some pirates are being prosecuted,
why should others get away with murder solely because Western
nations fear asylum claims?
This Article is concerned with these issues and examines
international refugee law and international human rights law in
an effort to determine the likely viability of any asylum claims
that may be brought by pirates convicted in the West. Based on
an analysis of the text of the main international treaties
governing asylum and non-refoulement, as well as interpretations of
the provisions contained in those treaties, this Article concludes
there is little reason to believe that Western states would be
required to grant refugee status (as that term is defined in the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) to convicted
pirates. Among other things, pirates are not a group that is
subject to persecution, and pirates have committed the types of
serious and violent crimes that should exclude them from
claiming refugee status—and thus, the residence and other
benefits associated with being granted asylum.
Second, states should be able to legally expel or deport
convicted pirates under international human rights treaties since
most pirates are likely unable to show they would face torture if
expelled or returned to their country of origin. Even if pirates
could show they risk torture or other inhumane treatment upon
return, states may be able to satisfy their international obligations
regarding non-refoulement and return pirates if the state receives
25. See Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace Capture as Route to Europe,
TELEGRAPH (London), May 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
piracy/5350183/Somali-pirates-embrace-capture-as-route-to-Europe.html.
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diplomatic assurances that the authorities would not resort to
such treatment. Furthermore, under the recent European
Qualitative Directive, European Union Member States are not
required to grant benefits such as residence permits to
individuals who have committed serious and violent crimes, even
though the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits
refoulement to face torture or other ill treatment.
Finally, even if there is some risk that some pirates can
mount successful asylum or non-refoulement claims, the risk is one
that developed Western states should assume because of the
greater good that will come from ensuring that pirates are
brought to justice (especially by way of fair trials and processes
that respect human rights).26 Developed nations risk asylum
claims (by pirates and others) simply because they are
developed—a status that typically carries with it an expectation
that the state will protect human rights and enforce the rule of
law. In this instance, enforcing the rule of law means that nations
must invoke universal jurisdiction or use the prohibitions
contained in international treaties and in their own domestic
laws to prosecute violent and dangerous pirates even if it means
they must consider and adjudicate some additional asylum
claims. Bringing to justice the pirates that commit violent acts
and disrupt international waters is a goal as worthy as numerous
others where nations accept the risk of asylum claims, and pirates
are unlikely to be deterred from committing those acts unless
nations commit to end the current culture of impunity.
Part I of this Article describes the modern piracy problem,
including the international law governing piracy, and the culture
of impunity that surrounds it. Part II provides a brief overview of
the international law providing protection for those seeking
26. See Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy within
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 201–02 (2010).
Prosecuting pirates in national courts is necessary even if piracy is included within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The ICC relies on a system of
complementarity and expects that state parties will prosecute in their courts serious
crimes of concern to the international community. Including piracy within the
jurisdiction of the ICC will simply provide another avenue to prosecute captured pirates,
particularly in those instances where only a failed state such as Somalia (without
resources or judicial capacity) otherwise has the best case for jurisdiction over the
offense. If piracy is not included within the ICC or some other international tribunal, it
is even more important that developed nations accept the burdens associated with
prosecuting captured pirates in their domestic courts. See id. at 235–36.
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asylum, focusing on international refugee law as well as the
primary treaties under international human rights law that
govern the transfer of persons and specifically prohibit transfer
to states where those persons would be subjected to torture or ill
treatment. Parts III and IV analyze international refugee law and
international human rights law in the context of potential claims
by convicted pirates seeking asylum and protection against nonrefoulement. The Article concludes by suggesting that although
prosecuting pirates may require states to also consider additional
asylum claims, the risk that states will have to grant such claims is
small and also a burden they should assume so that pirates may
be brought to justice.
I.

THE PIRACY PROBLEM

A. Modern Piracy: An Ever-Increasing Threat
Although some might think piracy is the stuff of history and
legend, piracy is actually a modern and ever-increasing threat to
the international community. According to the IMB, between
January 2005 and December 2009, there were 1477 pirate attacks
worldwide.27 Furthermore, the number of reported pirate attacks
in 2009 alone exceeded by at least twenty-five percent the total
number of such attacks in each of the prior four years.28 These
attacks were not without victims: in 2009, pirates boarded
approximately 153 vessels, hijacked 49 ships, and took 1052 crew
members hostage.29 Sixty-eight of those crew members were
injured in those incidents, and eight were killed.30 Although the
highest number of pirate attacks in 2009 occurred off the Gulf of
Aden and the coast of Somalia, significant numbers of attacks
also occurred in the waters off of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nigeria, and Peru.31 Victims of the attacks include flag
states, ship owners, crew members, and cargo from all over the
globe.32
27. ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 5–6. This amounts to almost one attack every day
some place in the world.
28. Id. at 5–6.
29. Id. at 25.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5–6.
32. See Piracy on the High Seas: Protecting Our Ships, Crews and Passengers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp. and Subcomm. on Surface Transp. and
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The breadth and availability of equipment and technology
has further increased the threat associated with piracy today. The
use of guns in pirate attacks has more than tripled since 2007.33
Somali pirates use automatic weapons and rocket propelled
grenades to board and hijack vessels where they take crew
hostage and demand ransom payments.34 Pirates attacking off the
coast of Nigeria are reported to be armed with knives and
automatic weapons, which they often use against crewmembers
during attacks.35 In addition, pirates now operate from highspeed maneuverable skiffs that are supported by “mother ships,”
enabling them to launch attacks from a distance of up to 1000
nautical miles.36 In many cases, they are armed with satellite
phones and GPS systems that allow them to track ships to target
for attack.37

Merch. Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Sec., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Brian
Salerno, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, US Coast
Guard) [hereinafter Statement of Salerno] (“[A] single piratical attack affects the
interests of numerous countries, including the flag State of the vessel, various States of
nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal States, owners’ States, and
cargo shipment and transshipment States.”); ICC-IMB , supra note 1, at 5–6.
33. See ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 12.
34. See id. at 22.
35. See id. at 25, 40.
36. See, e.g., id. at 23 (reporting that some attacks off the coast of Somalia had
occurred at distances of approximately 1000 nautical miles from Mogadishu); PIRACY
OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that pirate skiffs now
operate with as many as two 150 horsepower outboard motors attached); ROGER
MIDDLETON, PIRACY IN SOMALIA: THREATENING GLOBAL TRADE, FEEDING LOCAL WARS 4
(2008) (noting that Somali pirates now use mother ships to increase the range from
which they can launch attacks); Worldwide Hijackings Fall but Pirates Expand Area of
Operation, DAILY NEWS (Colombo), May 6, 2010, http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/05/06/
bus60.asp (stating that pirate attacks had occurred some 1000 nautical miles off the
Somali coast); see also Thean Potgieter, The Lack of Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Region: Scope and Effect, 31 STRATEGIC REV. S. AFR. 65 (2009). In fact, on November 15,
2008, Somali pirates captured the Sirius Star, a supertanker carrying more than two
million barrels of oil destined for the United States, some 450 nautical miles southeast of
Kenya. This capture alerted the world to pirates’ ability to extend their reach well
beyond the coastlines by using mother ships from which faster, smaller skiffs loaded with
outboard motors can be launched. Id.
37. See PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17–18
(noting that pirates are equipped with sophisticated technology that they obtain using
their ransom profits); Piracy Hit All-Time High in 2009, Says Report, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/842406/-/vpb4gn/-/
index.html (explaining that pirates are equipped with automatic weapons, as well as
high-tech communication gadgets like laptops, computers, satellite cell phones, and
other military hardware).
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Furthermore, although some pirates may be simple
fisherman, recent reports indicate that attacks are being carried
out by well-organized pirate gangs often headed by kingpins or
backed by investors and corrupt officials lured by the hefty
ransoms that pirates can now demand for the safe release of ships
and their crews.38 Some authorities estimate that ransom
payments made to pirates for the safe return of crew totaled
more than US$100 million for the year 2009.39 Estimates further
put the average ransom at between US$2 million and US$3
million, with “mere gunmen” in Somalia earning up to
US$15,000 for participating in an attack.40
Some pirates have become so wealthy that they can hire
others to carry out the attacks: they invest in weapons, boats, and
communications equipment, but face little risk of arrest or
38. See, e.g., ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION [AWEU], REPORT: THE
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, at 6, WEU Doc. A/2037 (June 4,
2009) (suggesting that piracy today is more like organized crime with many competing
pirate gangs, and with profits shared according to fixed rules whereby thirty percent
goes to investors, fifty percent to the attackers, and five percent to families of deceased
or captured pirates); Kraska, supra note 19, at 199 (stating that organized crime kingpins
who live in Puntland or Mombassa, Kenya are the recipients of most of the ransom
monies collected by Somali pirates); Potgieter, supra note 36 (stating that modern
pirates are often organized along military lines, and that one of the most prominent
groups is the Somali Marines, an organization with between seventy-five and 100
members); Scott Baldauf, Pirates, Inc.: Inside the Booming Somali Business, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 31, 2009, at 6 (reporting that modern pirates are backed by a network of
investors and corrupt officials who purchase equipment for them, assist in choosing
targets based on the Lloyd’s of London list of insured ships, and thereafter pay
themselves by underground money transfers); Michael G. Frodl, Somali Piracy Tactics
Evolve; Threats Could Expand Globally, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Apr. 10, 2010,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/April/Pages/SomaliPiracy
TacticsEvolve.aspx (reporting that pirates are funded not just by ransoms and local
investor money, but also by the flow of capital from foreign criminal gangs).
39. See, e.g., Costa, supra note 18, at 8. For examples relating to individual ransom
payments, see REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, supra
note 38, at 4 (pirates received US$3.2 million for the release of the Ukrainian ship Faina
after five months and received US$3 million for the release of the Sirius Star after two
months); Mohamed Ahmed & Abdi Guled, Ransom Paid for Oil Tanker, Somalia Pirates
Feud, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE60G1J420100117 (pirates received ransom of approximately US$5.5 million in
January 2010 for the release of a Greek-flagged tanker); Tsvetelia Tsolova, Somali Pirates
Free UK-Flagged Ship after Ransom, REUTERS, June 11, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65A59V20100611 (in June 2010, US$5.8
million was paid to pirates for the release of a UK-flagged ship).
40. See Baldauf, supra note 38; see also PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that an armed pirate can earn between US$6000
and US$10,000 for a single hijacking yielding a ransom of about US$1 million).
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prosecution because they never board ships.41 In fact, one report
indicates that pirates in Somalia have organized an exchange
market where local financiers can find pirate gangs to
underwrite.42 One wealthy former pirate told the reporter that
the exchange now hosted some seventy-two “maritime
companies,” ten of which had mounted successful hijackings in
only a four-month period.43
B.

The International Law Governing Maritime Piracy

Pirates need not go unpunished for their criminal conduct
inasmuch as international law provides many legal tools for
prosecuting pirates. Under customary international law, piracy is
the oldest crime to which universal jurisdiction44 applies.45 For
41. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY,
supra note 38, at 9; Uma Shankari, Follow the Money Trail to Reduce Piracy: Official Pirate
Backers, Such as Organised Crime Groups, Get Bulk of Ransom Money, SHIPPING TIMES
(Singapore), Oct. 15, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20297638 (suggesting that piracy is a
form of organized crime and that the backers of the piracy are organized crime groups
who get the bulk of the ransom money).
42. See Mohamed Ahmed, Pirate Stock Exchange Helps Fund Hijackings, FIN. POST
(Ontario),
Nov.
30,
2009,
http://www.financialpost.com/news-sectors/
story.html?id=2289558 (outlining the pirate stock market in Somalia and explaining how
an increase in shareholders increases the money available to fund pirates’ operations,
which subsequently increases the ransom monies gained); see also Michael Scott Moore,
The Pirate Stock Market, MILLER-MCCUNE, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.miller-mccune.com/
politics/the-pirate-stock-market-5935.
43. See Ahmed, supra note 42.
44. In 2000, a group of scholars and jurists met at Princeton University to examine
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the document resulting from that meeting, The
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction was defined as “criminal
jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of
the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.” PRINCETON
PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION 28 (2001).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (“The
common law, too, recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own
municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations (which is part of the
common law) as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed
an enemy of the human race.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987) (stating that piracy is one of the offenses that the
United States and other states may define and adjudicate according to the universality
principle); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72 (9th ed. 1783) (stating that
piracy is a violation of the law of nations and that “every community” has a right to
punish pirates); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 110–11 (2001)
(“[U]niversal jurisdiction to prevent and suppress piracy has been widely recognized in
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centuries, nations have deemed pirates to be hostis humani generis
(enemies of all mankind), such that any nation may use its own
domestic laws to try and to punish those committing piracy,
regardless of the pirates’ nationalities or where the piratical acts
took place.46 It is the general heinousness of piratical acts and the
fact that they are directed against ships and persons of many
nationalities that warrants universal jurisdiction.47 In addition to
universal jurisdiction, two international treaties provide the
jurisdictional bases for nations to prosecute piracy domestically.
The first is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), which specifically defines the crime of piracy.48
The second is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA
Convention”).49 Drafted in response to the Achille Lauro incident
when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner, the
SUA Convention covers ship hijackings.50 Some 161 states are
parties to UNCLOS,51 and 156 are parties to the SUA
Convention.52
customary international law as the international crime par excellence to which universality
applies.”); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335–
39 (1925) (suggesting pirates as enemies of all mankind were subject to universal
jurisdiction since the early seventeenth century).
46. See 3 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 113 (1797);
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785,
791 (1988).
47. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 60 (1981) (explaining that piracy was subject to universal
jurisdiction because of its heinousness); Randall, supra note 46, at 793–94 (suggesting
that the most accurate rationale for providing universal jurisdiction over piracy relies on
the wicked and heinous nature of piracy offenses which involve violence and
depredation and the fact that piracy is directed against ships of all nations); see also
Statement of Salerno, supra note 32 (“Maritime piracy is a universal crime under
international law because it places the lives of seafarers in jeopardy and affects the
shared economic interests of all nations.”).
48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 100–08, 110, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
49. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter SUA
Convention].
50. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY,
supra note 38, at 12; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro,
Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 269, 270–72 (1988).
51. For a list of state ratifications, see U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the
Sea, Chronological List of Ratifications to the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm
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Article 105 of UNCLOS codifies piracy’s status as a crime
subject to universal jurisdiction and provides that any state may
seize pirate ships and arrest and prosecute pirates.53 In addition,
under Article 100, states are actually required to cooperate in the
repression of piracy to the fullest possible extent,54 a mandate
that suggests that states should make some efforts to assist in the
arrest and prosecution of pirates. Regarding the acts over which
states would have jurisdiction, UNCLOS defines piracy as:
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
ship or aircraft;
any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).55

Under Article 103, a ship is a pirate ship “if it is intended by the
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of
committing one of the acts referred to Article 101.”56
In sum, UNCLOS provides a definition of the crime of piracy
that is broad enough to cover many acts of modern piracy.57 In
(last updated Nov. 15, 2010). Notably, although the United States is not a party to
UNCLOS, it did ratify an earlier version of the treaty with identical provisions regarding
piracy. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
52. See Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
53. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 105.
54. Id. art. 100 (“All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State.”).
55. Id. art. 101.
56. Id. art. 103.
57. Although UNCLOS does contain a broad definition of the crime of piracy,
commentators have noted that it may not be able to cover all acts that are presently
understood or reported as pirate attacks. For example, under Article 101 of UNCLOS,
the definition of piracy includes only those acts that occur on the high seas or outside
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addition, the vast majority of nations are party to UNCLOS, and
it even contains a provision that, at least in theory, requires
nations to prosecute piratical acts.58
Under the SUA Convention, a prohibited offense is
committed by anyone who (1) “seizes or exercises control over a
ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation,”59 (2) “performs an act of violence against a person
on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship,”60 or (3) attempts to do any of the above.61
In contrast to UNCLOS, this convention applies to offenses
committed even in territorial or archipelagic waters or in port, as
long as the ship is scheduled for international navigation.62 In
terms of jurisdiction, any signatory state may prosecute violations
of the SUA Convention provided that the offense (1) was against
a ship flying its flag, (2) occurred in its territory, (3) was
committed by a national of the state, or (4) had a national of the
state as a victim.63 Furthermore, the convention requires the
signatory state in whose territory an offender is found to either
extradite or prosecute.64 Accordingly, the SUA Convention,
unlike UNCLOS, does appear to cover pirate attacks that occur
while ships are in territorial waters.65 And although only signatory
states with a nexus to the offense are entitled to prosecute,66 156
states are party to the convention. Furthermore, as noted above,
there are four different ways in which signatories may assert the

the territory of any state. Thus, where acts of piracy occur in territorial waters and ports,
UNCLOS is not applicable. In such cases, only the nation in whose territory the acts
occurred has jurisdiction to prosecute using UNCLOS. Other nations would have to use
other legal tools, such as universal jurisdiction or the SUA Convention, discussed below,
in order to prosecute acts of piracy that occurred in the territorial waters of another
state. See id. art. 101.
58. Id. art. 100.
59. SUA Convention, supra note 49, art. 3(1)(a).
60. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
61. Id. art. 3(2)(a).
62. Id. art. 4.
63. Id. art. 6.
64. Id. arts. 7, 10.
65. Id. art. 3. However, the SUA Convention also may not cover attacks occurring
solely while a ship is docked at shore given the treaty’s requirement that the attack “is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship.” Id. art. 3(1)(b).
66. See id. art. 6.
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necessary nexus to the offense allowing them to prosecute
offenders on their soil.67
C. The Culture of Impunity: Nations’ Reluctance to Prosecute Pirates
The international community has demonstrated its concern
over the severity of the problems associated with modern piracy
in a number of ways. Naval patrols incorporating a host of
different nations have formed and now roam pirate-infested
waters in an effort to disrupt pirate attacks.68 The United Nations
Security Council has also taken unprecedented steps in an effort
to repress piracy occurring off the coast of Somalia. By a series of
resolutions adopted during 2008, the Security Council not only
authorized coalition navies to enter the territorial waters of
Somalia and use “all necessary means to repress acts of piracy
and armed robbery,” but also authorized states to use land-based
operations in Somalia to fight piracy.69 Indeed, by Resolution
1851, for a period of one year, “[s]tates and regional
organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia” were permitted to take
“all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia . . . to
bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan,
facilitate or undertake acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”70
That resolution received unanimous support from member

67. See id.
68. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY,
supra note 38, at 8–9 (noting that in November 2007, countries, including Canada,
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, began providing naval escorts for World Food
Program ships and that various multinational naval operations have cooperated to
conduct counter-piracy operations thereafter); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008), ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
S/2009/146 (Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that beginning in late 2008, a multinational naval
force comprised of some fifteen states (CTF-150) started conducting counter-piracy
operations around the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean). The
European Union has also launched its own counter-piracy operation off the coast of
Somalia using frigates and naval patrol aircraft. See REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, supra note 38, at 9. In addition, China, India,
and Russia have coordinated their actions with other forces. See id.
69. See S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res.
1851, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
70. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 69, ¶¶ 6–7.
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states, who stressed the many negative consequences resulting
from the acts of piracy off of Somalia’s coast.71
In addition, international and regional groups have been
formed to address the problem of piracy and to study ways to
repress it. The United States, for instance, created an
International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(“Contact Group”).72 As of June 2010, some fifty nations were
members of the Contact Group, which has working groups to
focus on a variety of counter-piracy efforts.73 Nations in the areas
closest to important shipping lanes have also been coordinating
separately to address the problem of piracy. In January 2009,
seventeen states from the areas surrounding the Western Indian
Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea met in Djibouti and
adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy
(“Djibouti Code”).74 The Djibouti Code covers, among other
things, the possibilities of shared naval and air patrols, as well as
the use of piracy information exchange centers in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Yemen.75 Saudi Arabia recently signed the Djibouti
Code, becoming the thirteenth state to sign the code of
conduct.76
However, despite all this cooperation and the monies spent
on patrols (which some estimates suggest total well over US$1
71. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use LandBased Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight against Piracy off Coast, Unanimously
Adopting 1851, U.N. Press Release SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008).
72. See Statement of Salerno, supra note 32, at 7.
73. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia Marks First Anniversary (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2010/01/135862.htm. The working groups are (1) military coordination and
information sharing, (2) judicial aspects of piracy, (3) shipping self-awareness, and (4)
improvement of diplomatic and public information aspects of piracy. Id.
74. See, e.g., High-Level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of Conduct to Repress Acts of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, INT’L MAR. ORG., Jan. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=10933; IMO Djibouti Meeting Agrees
Antipiracy Measures, MARINE LOG, Jan. 30, 2009, available at www.marinelog.com/DOCS/
NEWSMMIX/2009jan00302.html; Nine Countries Sign Deal to Fight Somali Piracy,
ALARABIYA.NET (Dubai), Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/
2009/01/29/65299.html; International Maritime Organization [IMO], Protection of Vital
Shipping Lanes: Sub-Regional Meeting to Conclude Agreements on Maritime Security, Piracy, and
Armed Robbery against Ships for States from the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea Areas, and Western
Indian Ocean, at 5, IMO Doc. C/102/14 (Apr. 3, 2009).
75. See IMO, supra note 74, ¶ 10.
76. See Saudi Arabia Signs Djibouti Anti-Piracy Code, MAR. EXEC., Mar. 11, 2010,
available at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/saudi-arabia-signs-djibouti-antipiracy-code.
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billion annually),77 pirate attacks are on the rise.78 Pirates are not
being deterred from their criminal activities, a fact which is
unsurprising if one considers that the majority of pirates are not
prosecuted even after being captured while committing acts of
piracy.79 Although pirates could be prosecuted using universal
jurisdiction or under UNCLOS or the SUA Convention,80 a
culture of impunity reigns81 whereby the majority of captured
pirates are returned to their skiffs or dropped on shore.82 States
have apparently used universal jurisdiction as a basis for
prosecuting acts of piracy only in very few instances.83 States have
used UNCLOS and the SUA Convention provisions even more
rarely.84 Many have not even implemented domestic legislation

77. See Costa, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
80. Indeed, as noted above, both UNLCOS and the SUA Convention contain
provisions which purport to obligate states to cooperate in bringing pirates to justice. See
SUA Convention, supra note 49, arts. 7, 10; UNLCOS, supra note 48, art. 100.
81. Some nations are prosecuting pirates, but the prosecutions are few when
compared to the number of pirates (including those who finance and plan the attacks)
who must have participated in several hundred attacks that have occurred in each of the
last several years. For example, the Netherlands prosecuted five Somali pirates who
attacked a Dutch Antilles-flagged ship. In June 2010, those five were found guilty of sea
robbery. See Toby Sterling, Dutch Court Sentences 5 Somali Pirates to 5 Years, WASH. TIMES,
June 17, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/17/dutch-courtsentences-5-somali-pirates-5-years. France is prosecuting several more piracy suspects. See
Corder, supra note 4. The first pirate prosecuted by the United States in more than a
century pled guilty in May 2010 to participating in hijacking the Maersk Alabama and
holding its American captain hostage off the coast of Somalia during April 2009. See, e.g.,
Patricia Hurtado & David Glovin, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in U.S. to Hijacking Ship,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 19, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-05-19/somali-man-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-to-hijacking-ship-off-africa.html;
Ed
Pilkington, Somali Faces First Trial in over a Century in the US for Piracy, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 22, 2009, at 15. In July 2010, Seychelles sentenced eleven Somali pirates
to ten years in prison for attempting to seize a coastguard boat in September. See Eleven
Somali Pirates Jailed in Seychelles, RTT NEWS, July 26, 2010, http://www.rttnews.com/
Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1370247&SM=1.
82. See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
83. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 192 (2004) (citing ALFRED RUBIN, THE LAW
OF PIRACY 302, 348 n.50 (2d ed. 1998)).
84. See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulties of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243, 254 (2010) (stating that the SUA Convention
has only been used once—in a case originally brought by the United States in the
United States District Court in the District of Hawaii against a cook who commandeered
a fishing trawler); Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L.
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incorporating treaty provisions relating to the repression of
piracy—even though they agreed to do so by the treaty terms.85
Absent a significant increase in criminal prosecutions, it is
unlikely that pirates will be deterred from committing their
violent—and lucrative—acts.86 Indeed, in April 2010, the
international community and the Security Council noted that the
failure of nations to accept their duty to prosecute and imprison
pirates was undermining the international community’s antipiracy efforts.87 To address this failure, the Security Council
adopted a unanimous resolution calling on all states to
criminalize piracy under their national laws and to consider
favorably the prosecution of piracy suspects and imprisonment of
convicted pirates.88
Nations—particularly Western nations—should do just that:
arrest, prosecute, and jail pirates. Western nations generally have
the expertise, institutions, and funds required to prosecute
pirates, and they should not be permitted to assert the fear of
asylum claims as a reason for refusing to prosecute captured
133, 136 (2006) (noting that UNCLOS apparently has only been used once in a case
against Greenpeace).
85. See, e.g., AWEU, supra note 38, at 13.
86. Deterrence and the prevention of future criminal activity are primary goals of
criminal prosecutions—including international criminal prosecutions. For example, the
preamble to the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court emphasizes the
potential deterrent effect of the court, noting that it is being created “to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of [the covered crimes] and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., ¶
5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (“The
pursuit of justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human values,
helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contributes to the prevention and
deterrence of future conflicts.”); c.f. Michael P. Scharf, Conceptualizing Violence: Present
and Future Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems
Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: The
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Tribunal Since
Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 869 (1997) (“If people in leadership positions know
there’s an international court out there, that there’s an international prosecutor, and
that the international community is going to act as an international police force, I just
cannot believe that they aren’t going to think twice as to the consequences. Until now,
they haven’t had to. There’s been no enforcement mechanism at all.” (quoting Richard
Goldstone)).
87. See S.C. Res. 1918, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); see also Press
Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1918 (2010), Calls on All
States to Criminalize Piracy Under National Laws, U.N. Press Release SC/9913 (Apr. 27,
2010).
88. See supra note 87.
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pirates on their own soil. Even if there is some risk of asylum
claims, that risk is outweighed by the duty to ensure that violent
criminals are brought to justice and that future violent acts are
deterred. Furthermore, that risk is one that must be assumed if
states are to live up to their obligations under international law.89
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDING
PROTECTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
Under international law, states are under no obligation to
grant asylum90 to those seeking it.91 However, where basic human
rights would be threatened by returning an individual to his
country of origin, a need for international protection may arise.92
Thus, the right to deny admission to asylum seekers is limited by
the principle of non-refoulement—a principle that finds expression
primarily in refugee law, but also in international human rights
law.93 Under that principle, states have a responsibility to protect
individuals from being removed, returned, or transferred to a
country where they are at risk of being persecuted or tortured.94
The non-refoulement provisions of particular relevance to the
problem of prosecuting pirates are contained in (1) the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
89. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) (discussing state duties to
prosecute international crimes and the legal foundations for such duties under
international law).
90. The term “asylum” has no agreed-upon definition in international law.
However, it generally refers to the protection of an individual by a state other than the
individual’s state of origin or habitual residence from human rights violations or other
similar proscribed harms. See CORNELIUS WOLFRAM WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT 23 (2009).
91. See WALTER KALIN & JORG KUNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION 510 (2009) (noting that Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides only that individuals have the right “to seek and enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution,” with no corresponding obligation on the part of states to
grant that asylum request); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948).
92. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Providing
International Protection Including through Complementary Forms of Protection, UNHCR Doc.
EC/55/SC/CRP.16 (June 2, 2005).
93. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373, 373–83 (2008); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, There’s No Place Like
Home: States’ Obligation in Relation to Transfers of Persons, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 703,
704 (2008).
94. WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 24.
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Convention”) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“1967 Protocol”);95 (2) the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”);96 (3) the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”);97 and (4) the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”).98

95. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The Refugee Convention
covers only those persons who have acquired the status of refugees as a result of acts
occurring before January 1, 1951. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is a
treaty that incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention and covers
those who have attained the status of refugees based on acts occurring after January 1,
1951. See The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. For a list of states party to the
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, see UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf.
96. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. For a list
of states party to CAT, see United Nations Treaty Collection (Feb. 12, 2010),
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter
=4&lang=en.
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. For a list of states party to
the ICCPR, see United Nations Treaty Collection (Feb. 12, 2010),
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang=en.
98. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (as amended by Protocol No. 11 and
including Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, and 14). For a complete full text list of the ECHR,
and all Protocols, see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Complete List of the Council of Europe’s Treaties,
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG
(last visited Dec. 1, 2010). For a list of states party to the ECHR, see COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=
8&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). There are other regional treaties that also
address states’ non-refoulement obligations. See, e.g., Convention Governing Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter
OAU Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Serv.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1 at 25
(1992); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58. Consideration of these regional treaties, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article because it is focused on the obligations of Europe and other Western nations to
prosecute pirates notwithstanding potential asylum claims.
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A. Non-Refoulement in the Refugee Context
The principle against refoulement was developed in relation
to the protection of refugees and is specifically addressed in the
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The purpose of the
convention is the international protection of fundamental
human rights of individuals who are not protected by their own
country.99 According to Article 33(1), “No Contracting State shall
expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”100
The protections against refoulement and the other benefits
associated with the Refugee Convention101 apply only to one who
satisfies the definition of “refugee” contained in Article 1(A)(2),
namely, a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”102
Even where an individual meets the definition in Article
1(A)(2), however, he or she may still be excluded from the
definition of “refugee” for certain other reasons. Specifically,
Article 1(F) forbids states from granting refugee status103 to:
any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that:

99. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 35.
100. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(1).
101. See infra Part. II.A (discussing the benefits associated with being a “refugee”
within the meaning of the Refugee Convention are not limited to a prohibition against
refoulement).
102. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(A)(2).
103. See James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New
World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 263 (2001). According to Professors Hathaway
and Harvey, Article 1(F) was designed to give legal force to Article 14(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that the right to asylum “may not
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or
from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Id. (quoting
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 91). They further suggest that
Article 1(F) is crafted as a mandatory mechanism of exclusion to reflect the
fundamental conviction that certain persons, because of the acts they have committed,
are not deserving of international protection. Id.
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He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee;
He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.104

Individuals who have committed the criminal acts referenced in
Article 1(F) are excluded from the definition of “refugee” under
the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which means
that they are not protected under refugee law from nonrefoulement and may be returned to their country of origin
(although, as noted below, they may be afforded some protection
against refoulement under international human rights law).105
Those who are accorded the status of refugee may also be
refused the convention’s protection against refoulement under
Article 33(2) because they pose a fundamental threat to the
country in which they are seeking refuge. The benefit of the nonrefoulement provision may not “be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”106
Therefore, even those who meet the “refugee” definition may
still be denied the protections against refoulement where there are
reasonable grounds to conclude they constitute a future danger
to the security of the country in which they are seeking refuge or
where their conviction of violent or other serious crimes causes
them to be a future danger to the community.107
Determinations of refugee status under the Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol are left to the state in whose

104. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F).
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2).
107. See Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the
Principle of Non-Refoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 134–35 (Erika
Feller et al. eds., 2003).
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territory the refugee applies for refugee status.108 However, state
parties to the Refugee Convention are required to cooperate with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) in the implementation and enforcement of the
convention.109 The UNHCR may provide advice and guidelines
on the proper interpretation of the convention’s terms.110 In
addition, in 1958, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council created the Executive Committee (“ExComm”) to advise
the UNHCR in the exercise of its statutory functions.111 The
ExComm adopts Conclusions on International Protection
advising states and the UNHCR on the proper interpretation and
application of the Refugee Convention.112 Nevertheless, while
both the UNHCR and the ExComm may issue advice and
guidance, neither has any specific enforcement power to obligate
states to adopt its views.113 Accordingly, states may vary somewhat
in the criteria they apply in determining whether an individual is
entitled to refugee status and asylum (and the benefits, such as
residency that are associated with that status) or protection from
refoulement.
In the event the state does determine the individual meets
the “refugee” definition and is not otherwise excludable under
Article 33(2), the Refugee Convention entitles the individual to
certain benefits in addition to protection against refoulement. For
example, refugees have the right to access courts of the state
(Article 16); to seek wage-earning employment, subject to certain
limitations (Articles 17–19); to receive elementary education
108. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 53–54 (3d ed. 2007).
109. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, pmbl., arts. 35–36.
110. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 40–41; see also UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan.
1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Refugee Handbook].
111. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 44.
112. Id. at 45. The Executive Committee (“ExComm”) is comprised of a number of
states that are members of the United Nations.
113. Id. at 40, 45–46. For example, the UNHCR Refugee Handbook is referred to
in refugee status proceedings throughout the world, though courts also often note that
it is not binding. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 54 n.17; see also
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427–28 (1999).
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that although the UNHCR Refugee
Handbook “may be a useful interpretive aid . . . it is not binding on the Attorney
General, the BIA, or the United States courts.” Id.
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(Article 22(1)); to obtain certain housing and social welfare
rights (Articles 20–21, 23–24); and to obtain travel documents,
subject to certain limitations (Article 28). Because these rights
are guaranteed by virtue of satisfying the definition of “refugee”
under the Refugee Convention, persons meeting the definition
also benefit from the ability to have the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees intervene on their behalf to insist
that those rights are observed by state parties.114
B.

Non-Refoulement in the Human Rights Context

Those not granted refugee status nor protected against
refoulement under international refugee law may still benefit from
the principle under the “complementary protection” granted by
states under international human rights law.115 The treaties
prohibiting refoulement most relevant to the potential asylum
claims that could be brought by pirates convicted in Western
nations are CAT, the ECHR, and the ICCPR.116 Each prohibits—
or has been interpreted to prohibit—returning persons to
countries where they would face torture, or in some cases, where
they would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.117 Unlike the Refugee Convention, which allows for
certain exclusions and exceptions to the prohibition against
refoulement, the provisions in each of these three human rights
treaties is worded in terms that have caused some to conclude

114. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 35; KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91,
at 513.
115. See Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection and Beyond: How States Deal with
Human Rights Protection 1 (UNHCR: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper
No. 118, 2005). “Complementary protection” describes the protection granted by states
to individuals on the basis of an international need outside the Refugee Convention
framework. That protection may be available under a human rights treaty or under
more general humanitarian principles, such as where protection is given to those fleeing
war and violence. See id.; see also Gillard, supra note 93, at 727 (noting that even those
who fail to receive protection under refugee law may be entitled to “complementary
protection” under international human rights law, or under international humanitarian
law, if he or she is in a state experiencing armed conflict). The present Article is limited
to discussing the claims that captured pirates might assert under international treaties,
and accordingly, an analysis of any potential humanitarian claims is beyond its scope.
116. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 3(1); ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 7; ECHR, supra
note 98, art. 3.
117. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 98, art. 3.
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that they allow no exceptions or derogation.118 Nevertheless, as
described in more detail below, each of the treaties provides
somewhat varying levels of protection to applicants—for
example, in terms of the type of future potential conduct against
which the applicant may be protected and the level of risk the
applicant must show in order to receive protection. Moreover,
whether the applicant is protected against refoulement under these
treaties depends not only on whether the country to which the
applicant is applying for protection is a party to the treaty, but
also how the particular country has interpreted treaty provisions
or defined them in its own domestic law.119 Finally, even if the
individual is protected against refoulement pursuant to these
treaties, neither the treaties themselves—nor the bodies that
interpret them—require that the individual be accorded any
particular residence or other status in the receiving state.
C. The CAT Non-Refoulement Provision
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in December 1984120 and
entered into force in 1987. Article 3 of the treaty prohibits
returning an individual to a country where “there are substantial
grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture.”121 As the language suggests, refoulement is only
118. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 729; see also CAT, supra note 96, art. 2(2) (“No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture.”); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, ¶ 127 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html (stating that the prohibition
against torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contained in
the ECHR is absolute in nature such that states could not deport individuals who faced
such threats even where those individuals were accused of serious crimes and could
constitute a threat to national security if not deported).
119. Some scholars have suggested that the principle of non-refoulement has become
part of established customary international law such that states must comply with the
principle even if they are not parties to CAT, the ECHR, the ICCPR, or the Refugee
Convention. See, e.g., Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: A READER 130 (B.S. Chimni ed., 2000);
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140–64. However, other scholars disagree.
See, e.g., J.C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 363
(2005). This Article takes no position on the issue.
120. G.A. Res. 39/46, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
121. CAT, supra note 96, art. 3.
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proscribed where there is a risk of torture. An individual’s
potential exposure to other forms of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment does not give rise to a nonrefoulement obligation under CAT.122
CAT specifically defines torture as:
(a)ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in
or incidental to lawful sanctions.123

Notably, by the terms of the treaty, for a potential act to
constitute “torture,” which creates a non-refoulement obligation, it
must be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. Persons in danger
of being subjected to torture by private actors are not protected
from refoulement under CAT, unless a government official
consented or acquiesced to the abuse. According to the drafters,
the requirement for state action or acquiescence reflects the
expectation that any potential private violence or torture would
be addressed via domestic law enforcement mechanisms,
meaning that mechanisms for international protection would not
be required.124
Regarding the risk of torture, the risk must be one that the
individual personally faces.125 It is not enough that the country to
which the individual would be returned is one where there exists
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of
122. See David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement:
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999).
123. CAT, supra note 96, art. 1.
124. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 120 (1988).
125. KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 493–94.
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human rights.126 Furthermore, the individual must meet the
initial burden of showing there are “substantial grounds for
believing” he would be in danger of being subjected to torture in
the future if refouled.127 The Committee against Torture, whose
role it is to supervise compliance with CAT, offers the view that
“substantial grounds for believing” suggests a risk of future
torture “beyond mere theory or suspicion,” but not at the level of
“being highly probable.”128 However, while the Committee’s
views and interpretations129 of treaty language do provide some
guidance to states, its views, and even its decisions in individual
cases, are not binding.130
Rather, under CAT, states are charged with implementing
the terms of Article 3 into their own domestic laws, and the
precise terms of various state laws regarding non-refoulement to
face torture will differ as a result.131 For example, the United
States has expressly stated that it understands the “substantial
grounds” language in Article 3 to mean “it is more likely than
not” that the individual would be tortured.132 Canada, on the
126. See U.N. Comm. against Torture [UNCAT], General Comment No. 1:
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, ¶¶ 6–7,
U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 1]. The
Committee against Torture assesses the particular circumstances of each case to
determine whether the particular individual risks being subjected to torture. It
considers, among other things, whether the state concerned exhibits “a pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” Id. However, even if there are indications
that torture is regularly practiced in the state, the individual must still show that he is
personally in danger of being tortured. See UNCAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, Commc’n
No. 13/1993, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/12/D/13/1993 (Apr. 27, 1994).
127. See General Comment No. 1, supra note 126, ¶ 5; WOUTERS, supra note 90, at
484–87; Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 122, at 14–15.
128. See General Comment No. 1, supra note 126, ¶¶ 6, 7; UNCAT, R.K. v. Sweden,
Commc’n No. 306/2006, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/40/D/309/2006 (May 19, 2008)
(“[T]he Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real
and personal.”).
129. The International Court of Justice has authority to offer binding
interpretations of CAT’s provisions, but it has not yet had the opportunity to provide its
views. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 432.
130. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 96, art. 22(7); AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 63 (1999). The
Committee itself has noted that its views are only declaratory. UNCAT, Aemei v.
Switzerland, Commc’n No. 34/1995, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (May 29,
1997). Therefore, the Committee generally relies on moral persuasion to convince state
parties to follow its views and opinions.
131. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 221, 297.
132. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment—Ratification and Accession of the United States, ¶ 2, Oct.
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other hand, has broadened the protection available to
individuals under Article 3 and prohibits returning one to a
country where he would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, as opposed to only torture as defined by CAT.133
Furthermore, it is the courts of the state party to which
individuals facing torture must initially apply for protection
against refoulement. Individuals may only apply to the Committee
against Torture for protection if the state in which they seek to
remain is party to Article 22 of CAT,134 and even then, the
individual must have exhausted all potential state avenues for
relief.135 As of June 2010, forty-four states were party to Article
22.136 As noted above, even if the Committee determines that the
individual may not be returned because he faces a substantial
danger of being tortured, the Committee has no power to force
the state to comply with its decision, though it can, and will,
make efforts to persuade the country to adopt its views.137
D. The ICCPR Non-Refoulement Provision
The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in
1976. Together with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it forms the International Bill of
Human Rights.138 While the ICCPR legally binds states to protect
a variety of human rights, it does not specifically contain a non21, 1994, 1830 U.N.T.S. 322; see also United Nations, Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Declarations and
Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%
20IV/IV-9.en.pdf [hereinafter CAT Declarations and Reservations] (last visited Dec. 1,
2010).
133. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 97(1)
(Can.).
134. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 22(1). Under Article 22, state parties agree that
UNCAT may receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be a
victim of a violation of CAT by a state party—including a violation of the Article 3
prohibition on refoulement to face torture.
135. Id. art. 22(5)(b).
136. See generally CAT Declarations and Reservations, supra note 132.
137. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 431; see also Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra
note 122, at 17 (stating that the Committee cannot reach binding decisions, but rather
reviews petitions and forwards its opinions regarding the merits to the state party and
the individual concerned).
138. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of
International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 705 & n.7, 708 n.24 (1997).
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refoulement provision. Rather, the duty of states to refrain from
returning individuals to states where they would be subjected to
torture has been implied by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee—the committee responsible for implementation of
the ICCPR.139 That Committee has held that parties to the ICCPR
shall not remove a person to another country “where there are
substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7”
of the treaty.140 Article 6 protects the right to life, proscribes the
arbitrary deprivation of life, and regulates the imposition of the
death penalty.141 Article 7 provides, “No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”142
According to the Committee, states must not expose individuals
to any of the dangers listed above by virtue of their extradition,
expulsion, or refoulement.143
The ICCPR itself provides no definition of torture or the
other forms of proscribed ill-treatment or punishment. However,
at least in some respects, the Human Rights Committee has
interpreted the ICCPR’s protections against refoulement as being
broader than those contained in CAT. By its General Comments,
the Committee has stated that Article 7 protects against acts

139. The ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee pursuant to Article 28.
The Committee’s main role is to ensure state accountability through its power to review
and comment on reports that states are required to submit under Article 40—reports in
which states are to detail the measures they have adopted to give effect to the
pronouncements contained in the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 97, arts. 28, 40.
140. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., General Comment No. 31:
Nature of the General Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
141. See ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 6.
142. Id. art. 7.
143. In its General Comment No. 20 on Article 7, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee stated that, in its view, “States parties must not expose individuals to the
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon
return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.” 44th
Sess., General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition
of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/I/Rev.1 (Mar. 10, 1992); see U.N. Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 31, supra note 140, ¶ 12.

2011]

PIRATES AND ASYLUM

265

committed by persons acting in their private capacity as well as
persons acting in an official capacity.144
According to the Human Rights Committee, to avoid
refoulement under the ICCPR, the individual must meet the initial
burden of showing “substantial grounds for believing that there
is a real risk” of being subjected to torture, or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.145 The
applicant generally has the burden of initially producing detailed
information to support his claim.146 The state must then assess
the claim and submit substantive grounds for its position
regarding refoulement.147
Again, it is the state that has primary responsibility for
determining whether individual applicants are entitled to
protection against refoulement under the ICCPR. Individuals may
only bring claims before the Human Rights Committee if the
state in which they seek to remain is a party to the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR148 and if they have exhausted all domestic
avenues for relief.149 As of June 2010, 113 states were party to the
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol.150 To date, however, the Committee
has considered only a very few cases involving a claim to be
protected against refoulement under Article 6 or 7 of the ICCPR.151
As such, there is little case law to aid in interpreting the exact
scope of any non-refoulement obligation under the treaty. In fact,
144. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 143, ¶
2; U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 140, ¶ 8.
145. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 140,
¶ 12.
146. WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 396.
147. Id. at 396–97.
148. See Optional Protocol to the ICCPR art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
149. See id. art. 2.
(Feb.
12,
2010),
150. See
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV5.en.pdf.
151. Wouters found that as of August 2008, the Human Rights Committee had only
considered the merits of a refoulement claim under Article 7 of the ICCPR in eleven cases.
Of the eleven cases, five involved extradition. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 367 & n.41.
This author’s own research post-August 2008 did not reveal additional Article 6 or 7
cases in the refoulement context that addressed the merits of the issue (two cases were
deemed inadmissible). See UN Human Rights Committee, Wilfred v. Canada, Commc’n
No. 1638/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1638/2007 (Nov. 18, 2008); UN Human
Rights Committee, Esposito v. Spain, Commc’n No. 1359/2005, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/89/D/1359/2005 (May 30, 2007).
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many of the cases the Committee has considered under Article 6
or 7 concern claims seeking to avoid extradition to face charges
that carry a potential death sentence.152 In any event, even in
those cases where the Committee does determine the individual
is protected against refoulement under the ICCPR, those
determinations are not binding on state parties. As with the CAT
Committee, the committee overseeing the ICCPR is limited to
persuading the state to accept its views.153 The United States, for
example, does not accept the Committee’s conclusion that the
ICCPR creates a non-refoulement obligation. It argues that the text
of the ICCPR contains no such prohibition on refoulement and has
expressly stated that it does not intend to be bound to any nonrefoulement obligation under the ICCPR.154 Although the
Committee has expressed concern with the United States’ refusal
to adopt the Committee’s interpretation of Articles 6 and 7,155
the United States still maintains that the ICCPR does not give rise
to a non-refoulement obligation.156
E.

The ECHR Non-Refoulement Provision

The ECHR was adopted in 1950 and entered into force in
1953. All forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe
have ratified it.157 Although it too contains no specific non152. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 391–94.
153. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 297. Of course, Wouters
makes the point that if a state has committed to the optional procedures for individual
complaints, one may expect that the state will honor the views of the Committee and
that the Committee’s views in individual cases will be instructive. WOUTERS, supra note
90, at 366–67.
154. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (2006).
155. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 87th Sess., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Dec. 18, 2006).
156. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America, Addendum:
Comments by the Government of the United States of America on the Concluding
Observations
of
the
Human
Rights
Committee,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/Rev.1/Add.1, 8–10 (Feb. 12, 2008). The United States, however,
does acknowledge that it is bound by CAT not to refoule persons where the evidence
demonstrates “it is more likely than not” that the individual would be tortured. See id.
157. See DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 1–2 (2d ed. 2009).
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refoulement provision, one has been implied.158 The European
Court of Human Rights is empowered to interpret the
convention,159 and in Soering v. United Kingdom, it held that
Article 3 of the ECHR160 prohibits refoulement to countries where
there are “substantial grounds” to believe that the individual
would face a “real risk of . . . torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”161 Based on Article 3, the court has
developed a body of case law that has become a strong safeguard
against refoulement.162 For example, the protections of Article 3
cannot be derogated in time of war or other public emergency.163
Nor can even the highest interests of the public—such as to fight
terrorism164 or to protect national security165—justify state actions
that would breach Article 3. Furthermore, the protections of
Article 3 of the ECHR are available to everyone, regardless of

158. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853; Soering
v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34–35 (1989).
159. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 32(1).
160. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” Id. art. 3.
161. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35; see also Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 1853.
162. Until the entry into force of the Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR on November
1, 1998, the ECHR provided for a European Commission on Human Rights, which was
the initial stage at which individual applications for relief under the Convention were
considered. The Commission’s role was to either broker a friendly settlement or to
consider the case on the merits and issue a non-binding report. Thereafter, the case
would be referred to the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe, or the
European Court of Human Rights. With the Eleventh Protocol, the Commission was
abolished, and presently only the European Court of Human Rights interprets and
applies the ECHR. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 198–99. However, where the Court
has not spoken on an issue, some pre-1998 Commission interpretations remain
authoritative. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 17.
163. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978).
164. See Tomasi v. France, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 33 (1992).
165. See Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1855 (holding that the absolute character
of Article 3 did not permit deportation to India if there was a real risk of ill-treatment,
irrespective of the applicant’s conduct, and notwithstanding that such conduct may pose
dangers to the country’s national security). Indeed, the court noted that the protection
against refoulement under Article 3 is wider than that provided under Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention, which contains exceptions. See id.; see also Saadi v. Italy, No.
37201/66, ¶¶ 138, 141 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47c6882e2.html (confirming its decision in Chahal and holding that potential
danger to a state’s national security or community cannot influence a determination
under Article 3 as to whether or not the individual would face a real risk of ill-treatment
at the country of return).
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their character or their past criminal conduct.166 Moreover,
claims that the applicant will be ill-treated by private, as well as
public actors, may give rise to a non-refoulement obligation under
Article 3 if the evidence shows that the state would be unable to
protect the applicant from the private actors concerned.167
To obtain protection against refoulement under Article 3 of
the ECHR, the individual must present a credible claim
containing sufficient facts and circumstances to show he will be
subjected to a real risk of torture or ill-treatment in the country
of return.168 The initial burden of presenting evidence of a “real
risk” is on the applicant, after which the state has the burden of
assessing the claim and gathering any additional relevant
information regarding it.169 The necessary risk level is “a real,
personal, foreseeable or likely risk which goes beyond a mere
possibility but does not need to be certain or highly probable.”170
For a risk to be real and personal, it must relate to the individual;
the applicant must show particular circumstances that put him in
danger of harm.171 The general situation in the country of
166. See KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 494–95. For example, in Ahmed v.
Austria, the court held that if the applicant faced a real risk of being subjected to illtreatment in Somalia, the applicant’s criminal record was not material to the state’s
consideration of whether he was entitled to protection under Article 3 of the ECHR.
1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2195, 2208.
167. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 88; KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 495;
WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 225. In H.L.R. v. France, the court stated that it would not
rule out the possibility that Article 3 may “also apply where the danger emanates from
persons or groups of persons who are not public officials.” However, it noted that the
risk must be real and the authorities of the receiving state must not be able “to obviate
the risk by providing appropriate protection.” 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 745, 758.
168. The ECHR itself does not define torture nor inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, but the court has suggested that torture is the most severe form of illtreatment, and requires an element of intent to cause serious and cruel suffering. See
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66–67. Degrading treatment or
punishment is less severe, but precisely what constitutes such treatment will depend on
the facts and circumstances of the case. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 221–22, 238–40;
see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 70. The possibility of facing socio-economic
harms upon return, however, is not the type of ill-treatment against which Article 3
protects. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 240–41.
169. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 274.
170. See id. at 247. Wouters formulated this risk statement based on the court’s
language in several cases: Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1991);
Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36, 37 (1991); and Soering v.
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34–35 (1989).
171. For example, in Vilvarajah, the court concluded that there was no violation of
Article 3 based on returning applicants to Sri Lanka where the evidence did not indicate
that the applicants were personally being singled out for ill-treatment, but rather, faced
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return—even where massive human rights violations are
occurring—does not alone give rise to a claim under Article 3.172
As is the case with the other treaties, the state parties have
primary responsibility for ensuring that the rights and guarantees
of the ECHR are provided to persons within their jurisdiction.173
Claims alleging breaches of the convention’s terms must first be
brought before national courts.174 However, of the treaties
discussed, the ECHR provides for significantly more binding
oversight of state practices as regards treaty interpretation and
enforcement. For example, all state parties to the ECHR are
automatically subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights.175 In addition, both states and individuals are
entitled to bring claims alleging breaches of the convention’s
terms.176 In particular, pursuant to Article 34, state parties agree
that “any person, non-governmental organization or group of
individuals,” regardless of nationality, may bring an application
claiming to be a victim of a breach of the convention.177 The
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg178 has
jurisdiction over all such claims as long as all domestic remedies
have been exhausted.179
no greater threat of ill-treatment than did all Tamils, given the political situation in Sri
Lanka. Vilvarajah, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37.
172. See id.; see also H.L.R. v. France, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 758–59 (holding that
deportation to Colombia was not in violation of Article 3 where applicant pointed only
to the general situation of violence in Colombia, and did not show other factors
indicating that he would be personally targeted for ill-treatment).
173. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 13, 23. Article 1 of the ECHR requires the
parties to “secure” the rights of the Convention. ECHR, supra note 98, art. 1.
174. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 35(1); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at
23. Pursuant to Article 13 of the ECHR, states are required to provide an “effective
remedy” under national law for individuals who have arguable claims under the
Convention. ECHR, supra art. 13.
175. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 298.
176. See ECHR, supra note 98, arts. 33–34.
177. The Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR made this obligation to accept individual
complaints compulsory as of 1998. See id. art. 34.
178. Section II of the ECHR discusses the establishment of the court and the
election of judges. ECHR, supra note 98, § 2.
179. See id. art. 35(1). Although the European Court of Human Rights does have a
significant role in enforcing state non-refoulement obligations under Article 3, it has not
actually issued an enormous number of decisions in that context since 1989—the year it
first stated that Article 3 contained a prohibition against refoulement. As of August 2008,
Wouters found that the court had only delivered a decision on a complaint under
Article 3 of the ECHR involving a refoulement situation in twenty-nine cases. Of those
twenty-nine, nineteen concerned the return of aliens in the asylum context. See

270 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:236
Unlike the decisions of the bodies responsible for
overseeing the other treaties discussed above, the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights are binding on the parties to
the claim.180 State compliance with the court’s judgments is
monitored by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe,181 which is comprised of government representatives of
the various member states.182 However, even if the court
determines that refoulement is prohibited by Article 3 of the
convention, it will not specify what legal status the state should
accord the applicant.183
III. ARE PIRATES LIKELY TO SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING A
RIGHT TO ASYLUM AND PROTECTION AGAINST
REFOULEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW?
A. The Persecution Requirement
Pirates should not be able to meet the definition of a
“refugee” under the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
(nor receive its protections against refoulement) because they are
likely unable to demonstrate the “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion”184 that would
prevent them from being returned to their country of origin.
The evidence relating to pirates indicates that they are anything
but a persecuted group; rather they are individuals who hijack
ships and hold innocent crew hostage in exchange for ransom
payments. Moreover, any convicted pirates would only be in the
country in which they were seeking asylum because they were
captured committing illegal acts, not because they were fleeing
some circumstances that caused them to feel persecuted.185
WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 188–89 & nn.7–8. This author’s research post-August 2008
revealed only eleven more decisions in the refoulement context under Article 3.
180. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 46(1).
181. See id. art. 46(2).
182. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 5.
183. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 297.
184. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(A)(2).
185. In the case of Somalia, the UNHCR has stated that some individuals may
qualify for refugee status under the Refugee Convention on the grounds that they fled
their country because of the dangers associated with the armed conflict or generalized
violence in the country, particularly where the conflict is rooted in religious, ethnic, and
political disputes and where specific groups are being targeted. See UNHCR, Eligibility
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Indeed, even if the pirates could argue that they did not want to
return to their country of origin because of instability or poor
circumstances, this should not be enough to satisfy the “refugee”
definition. The UNHCR Refugee Handbook notes that poor
conditions in a country alone will not entitle one to international
protection as a refugee; the individual must show good reason
why he individually fears persecution.186
It is true that some Somalis have been able to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution or other ill-treatment by
demonstrating their membership in a minority clan or tribe that
is subjected to persecution because control of the area where
they live is in the hands of some other clan or tribe that
discriminates—sometimes violently—against them.187 Even in
those circumstances, however, some individuals may be returned
to Somalia where there is an internal flight or relocation
alternative,188 namely, to an area of Somalia where the individual
would be safe from persecution.189
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from
Somalia, 38, U.N. Doc. HCR/EG/SOM/10/1 (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR
Somalia Eligibility Guidelines]. As noted above, however, this consideration should not
be relevant to most pirates since they would not be in the country of refuge to flee
Somalia: they would only be in the country of refuge because they were captured
committing criminal acts that affect the international community.
186. See UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶¶ 37–39.
187. See, e.g., Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, ¶¶ 139–40, 146 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=812685&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=
F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (holding that returning a member of the
Ashraf minority clan who fled Somalia because of intimidation and assaults by persons in
control would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR since evidence showed he
faced real risk of ill-treatment if returned to “relatively safe” areas of Somalia); Refugee
Appeal No. 76062 [Oct. 15, 2007] New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority,
Auckland, ¶¶ 87–91, available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_
20071015_76062.pdf (holding that the applicant showed a well-founded fear of being
persecuted on the basis of race as member of a minority clan, the Bantu Tunni Torre, by
members of controlling clans, entitling him to “refugee” status within the meaning of
the Refugee Convention).
188. The internal flight or relocation alternative is premised on the idea that some
claims of persecution are limited to a specific part of the country (for example, because
the locale is controlled by some majority that discriminates against the minority
population of which the applicant is a member) and absent in another part. Where an
individual can be returned to a part of his country of origin where he will not be
subjected to persecution, international protection is unnecessary. See, e.g., UNHCR
Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 33; WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 104–05.
189. According to the UNHCR, it may be possible to internally relocate some
Somalis to Somaliland or Puntland if, for example, the individual is a member of a
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In any event, Somali pirates should not be among the
individuals who are able to show persecution because control of
an area is in the hands of persons who discriminate against them.
Pirates in Somalia are adding to the instability of the country in
the hopes of profiting wildly from their illegal activities, and they
also tend to control the parts of the country where they operate
and live. A recent report of the UNHCR notes that several parts
of southern and central Somalia are under pirate control.190 The
Nairobi Report, which was issued by an international expert
group on piracy occurring off the Somali coast, states that, as of
2008, the Puntland region of Somalia is an epicenter of piracy
and that it operates at all levels of society, including within
government.191 Of course, circumstances may change by the time
convicted pirates serve their sentences. But, at present, there is
little reason to believe that pirates would be able to demonstrate
a well-founded fear of persecution based on their characteristics
or beliefs, including their membership in a minority clan or
tribe.
B.

Article 1(F) Exclusion

Even if pirates could establish a well-founded fear of
persecution, however, they must be excluded from the definition
of “refugee” by operation of Article 1(F) because there are
“serious reasons for considering” that they have committed the
types of non-political crimes that make them undeserving of
international protection.192 Specifically, assuming they have
majority or minority clan or originates from the area. The existence of armed conflict in
southern and central Somalia has caused the UNHCR to conclude that presently there is
no available internal flight or relocation alternative in those areas. See UNHCR Somalia
Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 34–35. However, as of August 2010, and
although it is being criticized by human rights organizations and others, the
Netherlands has entered into a memorandum of understanding (the terms of which had
not been disclosed to the public) with the Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”) of
Somalia whereby rejected asylum seekers can be forcibly returned to the area near
Mogadishu, which is controlled by the TFG. See Marike Peters, Dutch Deportation of
Somalis “a Death Sentence,” RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE, July 22, 2010, available at
http://www.rnw.nl/english/print/144701;
Amnesty
International,
Netherlands:
Government Must Stop Imminent Deportation of Somalis, AI Index EUR 35/002/2010 (July
27, 2010).
190. UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 7.
191. PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17.
192. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F); see also UNHCR Refugee
Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 140 (noting that Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention
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committed violent and egregious acts such as murder or
hijacking in the course of a pirate attack, pirates would probably
meet the Article 1(F)(b) exclusion since they have committed “a
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge” prior
to admission to that country of refuge.193 Although states may
differ in how they define “serious crimes,” the UNCHR Refugee
Handbook suggests that a “serious crime” is a “capital crime or a
very grave punishable act.”194 Acts like murder and hijacking
would meet this definition.195 Pirates should also be unable to
claim their acts were political: acts are non-political where they
are committed for personal reasons such as financial gain,196
lists the categories of persons who are not considered deserving of international
protection); UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
3f7d48514.html [hereinafter UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines]. Article 1(F)(b)
implements the language of Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
by which the right to asylum “may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
91, art. 14(2), at 74.
193. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F)(b). Even egregious acts of piracy
would not likely meet the Article 1(F)(a) exclusion criteria because the acts prohibited
by that section are crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity as
defined in international instruments. See UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra
note 192, ¶¶ 11–13. Crimes against peace are essentially tantamount to crimes arising
from the planning, preparation, or initiation of a war of aggression. See WOUTERS, supra
note 90, at 122–23 (citing the definition of a “crime against peace” from the 1945
Charter of the International Military Tribunal). War crimes involve attacks committed in
times of armed conflict against those not participating or no longer participating in
hostilities. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, art. 8. Although “crimes against humanity”
contemplates egregious crimes, like murder and rape that might be part of a pirate
attack, to constitute a crime against humanity, the acts must be committed “as part of a
widespread or systematic attack” directed against a civilian population. See id. art. 7(1).
The UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines suggest that an isolated act can “constitute
a crime against humanity if it is part of a coherent system or a series of systematic and
repeated acts.” UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 13.
194. UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 155; UNHCR Article 1F
Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 14.
195. See, e.g., UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 155; UNHCR Article
1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 14. Indeed, most of the offenses with which a
pirate was charged in the Southern District of New York carried potential sentences of
between twenty years and life imprisonment. See Press Release, United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York, Somali Pirate Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court
to Maritime Hijackings, Kidnappings, and Hostage Takings (May 18, 2010), available at
http://www.ncis.navy.mil/PubNewsRoom/hlites/News%20Articles/
NCIS%20assists%20in%20conviction%20of%20Somali%20pirates.pdf.
196. UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 152; UNHCR Article 1F
Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 15. In Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, the US Supreme
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which is precisely why modern-day pirates are hijacking ships and
demanding huge ransom payments.197 Furthermore, the pirate
acts will necessarily have been committed outside the country of
refuge.198
Regarding Somalia, in particular, pirates are among the
types of criminals that the UNHCR cautions states to consider
excluding from refugee status.199 It advises states to pay particular
attention to, among others, those who are members of “criminal
gangs.”200 It defines those gangs to include individuals, such as
former militias, who are “lured into criminal activities for the
financial rewards from activities such as kidnapping and the
lucrative business of boarding ships in the Gulf of Aden or the
Court suggested that political crimes were those where the political aspect of the offense
outweighs its common-law character. 526 U.S. 415, 422 (1999).
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. The UNHCR suggests that states should weigh the gravity of the offense in
question against the consequences of exclusion—namely the likelihood of persecution
and its severity—when determining whether an individual must be excluded under
Article 1(F)(b). See UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 156; UNHCR Article
1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 24. However, not all states agree that such
balancing is appropriate. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the US Supreme Court stated that balancing
was not appropriate under Article 1(F)(b), noting that “it is not obvious that an alreadycompleted crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering the further
circumstance that the alien may be subject to persecution if returned to his home
country.” 526 U.S. at 426. The United Kingdom has also rejected applying a balancing
test when applying Article 1(F). See Helene Lambert, The EU Asylum Qualification
Directive, Its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and International Law, 55
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 175 (2006); see also Gil v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) [1995] 1 F.C. 508, 534–35 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he claimant to whom
the exclusion clause applies is ex hypothesi in danger of persecution; the crime which
he has committed is by definition ‘serious.’ . . . It is not in the public interest that this
country should become a safe haven for mass bombers.”). Professors Hathaway and
Harvey, similarly, argue that because asylum seekers described in Article 1(F)(b) could
not qualify for refugee status within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, states are
under no duty to consider the merits of a protection claim made by such persons.
Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 264. In any event, those pirates that have
committed murders or similarly grave offenses would not likely benefit from a balancing
test in any event. Indeed, by way of example, the UNHCR has commented that “a
person guilty of deliberate infliction of serious harm to or killing of civilians outside the
scope of combat would not benefit from proportionality considerations.” UNHCR,
Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, July 2009, at 35, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4a5edac09.html [hereinafter UNHCR 2009 1F Statement].
199. See UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 35 (“In light of
Somalia’s long history of armed conflict, serious human rights violations and
transgressions of international humanitarian law, exclusion considerations under Article
1F of the 1951 Convention may arise in relation to individual asylum claims by Somali
asylum-seekers.”).
200. See id. at 35–37.
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Indian [Ocean] and holding them, their crews and cargos for
ransoms.”201 Thus, although the UNHCR will still expect states to
consider the specific facts and circumstances associated with each
application for protection under the Refugee Convention,
pirates who belong to criminal gangs and have committed violent
acts against seafarers should come within Article 1(F)’s exclusion
provision denying refugee status to those who have committed
serious non-political crimes.
One question that arises is whether conduct will still be
considered a crime leading to exclusion from refugee status
under Article 1(F)(b) if the applicant has already been convicted
and served his sentence. Professors Hathaway and Harvey argue
that the preparatory documents leading to the Refugee
Convention suggest that Article 1(F)(b) is intended to exclude
fugitives and to ensure that refugee law does not impede state
obligations under extradition treaties.202 They therefore suggest
that persons who have committed crimes within the state of
refuge and persons whose crimes are no longer justiciable do not
fall within Article 1(F)(b).203
Nevertheless, they also recognize that not all commentators
or states agree that Article 1(F)(b) is so limited.204 For example,
the UNHCR Refugee Handbook advises that states should
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances when
making exclusion determinations under Article 1(F)(b).
Whether an individual has served his time is among those
mitigating factors, but that fact alone does not require states to
conclude that the individual cannot be excluded for having
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country.205 In
addition, more recent guidance from the UNHCR indicates that,
although the exclusion clauses should be interpreted in a
restrictive manner,206 states may still be justified in excluding
individuals who have committed grave and heinous crimes, even
if the individual has been pardoned or was granted amnesty for

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id. at 37 n.279.
Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 299–301.
See id.
See id. at 299–304.
UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 157.
UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 2.
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the offense.207 Furthermore, although they criticize the practice
as being inconsistent with the purpose of Article 1(F)(b),
Professors Hathaway and Harvey acknowledge that states have
excluded individuals who have committed serious non-political
crimes notwithstanding that the individuals had served time for
their offenses.208 Finally, it is worth pointing out that the
language of Article 1(F)(b) is not limited to persons who have
not yet been adjudged guilty and served time for their offenses; it
speaks only of serious, non-political crimes committed outside
the country of refuge.209 Accordingly, although some countries
may choose not to apply Article 1(F)(b) to individuals who have
served time for their offenses, many will not, and the language of
the provision and the guidance provided by the UNHCR do not
require that limitation on the article’s applicability.
In addition to relying on Article 1(F)(b)’s exclusion
provision, some states may also conclude that the broadly-worded
Article 1(F)(c)—which requires excluding individuals who have
committed “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations”—is also a basis for refusing to grant protection
to pirates under the Refugee Convention.210 The UNHCR
suggests that the language of Article 1(F)(c) is rather unclear
and, as a result, should be read narrowly.211 It also suggests that
because Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter basically
set out the fundamental principles that states must uphold in
their mutual relations, it appears that “in principle only persons
who have been in positions of power in a State or State-like

207. Id. ¶ 23; UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Sept. 4,
2003, ¶ 73, reprinted in 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR
Background Note to the Exclusion Clauses].
208. Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 302–03. For example, in Ovcharuk v.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Full Court of the Federal Court of
Australia concluded that nothing in Article 1(F)(b) required that its application be
limited only to those criminals who were fugitives from justice who had not already been
convicted and served time. (1998) 158 ALR 289, 294, 300, 302–04 (Austl.).
209. In fact, the UNHCR made just this same point. See UNHCR Background Note
to the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 207, ¶ 72; see also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra
note 108, at 175 (suggesting that the “fugitives from justice” thesis appears to be losing
favor as being inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words in Article 1(F)(b),
which contains no such limitation on its application).
210. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F)(c).
211. See UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 17.
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entity” would appear capable of committing acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.212
However, the UNHCR, like other commentators and courts,
has now stated that the broad language of the clause permits
other interpretations. In fact, the UNHCR acknowledges that the
present reality is one where individuals and groups other than
those in government can be responsible for acts—such as acts of
terrorism—which are contrary to the principles and purposes of
the United Nations.213 For example, in Pushpanathan v. Canada,
the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Article 1(F)(c)
applies to “individuals responsible for serious, sustained, or
systematic violations of fundamental human rights which amount
to persecution in a non-war setting” and “where there is
consensus in international law that particular acts constitute
sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental
human rights as to amount to persecution, or are explicitly
recognized as contrary to purposes and principles of the United
Nations.”214 In sum, although the precise contours of the Article
1(F)(c) exclusion clause are far from settled,215 in some
circumstances, individual pirates and the acts they commit may
be excludable under this provision if they are not already
excludable under Article 1(F)(b).
C. Article 33 (2) Exceptions to the Non-Refoulement Principle
Article 33(2)’s “security of the country” and “danger to the
community” exceptions may also operate in some circumstances
to bar convicted pirates who otherwise are able to meet the
“refugee” definition from the Refugee Convention’s refoulement
protection.216 Generally speaking, Article 33(2)’s exceptions
should be interpreted restrictively and may only be applied if
necessary and proportionate, which means that there must be a
rational connection between removing the refugee and the
212. See id.
213. See UNHCR 2009 1F Statement, supra note 198, at 28–29.
214. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982, ¶¶ 64, 65 (Can.).
215. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 189–90; WOUTERS, supra
note 90, at 126.
216. According to the UNHCR, Article 1(F) “is aimed at preserving the integrity of
the refugee protection regime,” while “Article 33(2) concerns protection of the national
security of the host country.” See UNHCR 2009 1F Statement, supra note 198, at 8.

278 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:236
elimination of the danger resulting from his presence in the state
or community in which he is seeking refuge.217 According to the
UNHCR, refoulement must be the last resort, and the state must
conclude that the danger to the state or community outweighs
the risks to the refugee if returned to his country of origin.218
Nonetheless, the United States does not require any
proportionality assessment under its equivalent of Article
33(2).219
The “security of the country” exception, however, is
probably not applicable in the majority of modern piracy cases
since it contemplates a showing of future danger that is so serious
as to be a threat to the national security of the host country.220
The types of acts that threaten national security are acts aimed at
overthrowing the government; acts which threaten the country’s
constitution, peace, and independence; and acts of terrorism and
espionage.221
However, convicted pirates may fall within Article 33(2)’s
“danger to the community” exception. That clause denies
protection against refoulement to individuals who, “having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitute[] a danger to the community” of the country in which

217. See Letter from Thomas Albrecht, UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative,
to Paul Engelmayer, Esq., WilmerHale, at 1–3 (Jan. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43de2da94.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Request
for Advisory Opinion].
218. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7–8; UNHCR, Note on Diplomatic Assurances and
International Refugee Protection, Aug. 2006, ¶ 13, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/44dc81164.html [hereinafter UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances].
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) denies asylum (which is the equivalent of refugee
status under the Refugee Convention) to an individual who “having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States.” “Withholding of removal” (which is the equivalent of protection
against refoulement under the Refugee Convention) is not available to an applicant if he,
“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to
the community of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). These provisions do
not require any consideration of whether refoulement would eliminate the danger or
whether refoulement is the last possible resort for eliminating the danger posed by the
individual’s presence in the community.
220. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 135–36; UNHCR Note on
Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12.
221. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 115; Atle Grahl-Madsen, UNHCR, Division of
International Protection, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 Articles 2–11,
13–37, at 140 (1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4785ee9d2.html (commentary written by Professor Atle Grahl-Madsen in 1963).
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they are seeking refuge.222 Although there is no universal
definition for “particularly serious crime,”223 commentators have
suggested that murder, rape, armed robbery, and arson are
examples of the types of crimes that would qualify.224 “Danger to
the community” refers to future danger to the population, rather
than to the larger interests of the state.225
One question that arises is the extent to which Article 33(2)
requires that one convicted of a particularly serious crime must
also be shown to be a danger to the community. The UNHCR
and some commentators suggest that the additional showing of
danger is necessary.226 According to the UNHCR, for the “danger
to the community” exception to apply, the refugee must have
been convicted of a very serious crime, and it must be shown
“that the refugee, in light of the crime and conviction,
constitutes a very serious present or future danger to the
community of the host country.”227 The assessment of danger
may include considerations of the nature of the crime
committed, the facts concerning its commission, and evidence of
recidivism or likely recidivism.228
On the other hand, states are charged with implementing
the Refugee Convention and are not bound by the UNCHR’s
interpretations of the convention.229 Thus, in the United States,
evidence that the individual has been convicted of a particularly
serious crime operates to also demonstrate that the individual is a
222. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2).
223. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 117. For example, in connection with
consideration of asylum claims (refugee status under the Refugee Convention), the
United States defines a “particularly serious crime” as encompassing “aggravated
felonies,” which include such acts as crimes of violence and theft offenses that carry a
term of imprisonment of at least one year and offenses relating to ransom demands. See,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); id. § 1101(a)(43)(F)–(H). In connection with
consideration of “withholding of removal” claims (refoulement under the Refugee
Convention), the United States defines a “particularly serious crime” to include
“aggravated felonies” committed by the alien for which he served an aggregate term of
imprisonment of at least five years. See id. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii).
224. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 139.
225. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 116; Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra
note 107, at 138.
226. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140; see also UNHCR Note on
Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12.
227. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12.
228. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 239–40; Lauterpacht &
Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140.
229. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
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danger to the community, such that refugee status and the
protections against refoulement are denied.230 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the plain language of the
provision—which mirrors Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention—includes no conjunction such as “and” between the
conviction clause and the danger clause, suggesting that no
separate determination of dangerousness is required.231 It further
explained that requiring a separate determination of
dangerousness would entail evidentiary difficulties relating to
proving the likelihood of the applicant’s recidivism—a burden it
concluded that Congress did not intend to impose on the
conduct of deportation proceedings.232
In light of the foregoing, it seems that Article 33(2)’s
“danger to the community” provision would probably bar many
pirates from protection against refoulement—assuming that any
pirates were able to even establish refugee status under Article 1
of the convention. First, pirates convicted of murder, hijacking,
armed robbery, or other violent acts associated with modern
piracy will have committed “particularly serious crimes.” As
noted above, in some jurisdictions like the United States, this
alone will mean that the pirate is also a danger to the
community. States should reach the same conclusion that the
pirate is a danger to the community applying the UNCHR’s test
that considers the nature and circumstances of the crime
committed and the likely recidivism of the criminal. Certainly
some pirates may claim that their unfortunate circumstances
caused them to engage in piracy. However, this and other
arguments are likely to be discounted where the underlying facts
demonstrate the pirate was involved, for example, in threatening
innocent seafarers at gunpoint and holding them hostage in
order to reap a financial windfall. Furthermore, although each
case will have its own unique facts, pirates who have committed
230. See, e.g., Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1141 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Conviction of a particularly serious crime necessarily renders one a danger to the
community.” (quoting Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir.
1985))); Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 555 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[O]nce the particularly
serious crime determination is made, the alien is ineligible for withholding without a
separate finding on dangerousness.” (quoting Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084, 1088 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc))).
231. Zardui-Quintana, 768 F.2d at 1222.
232. See id. at 1222–23.
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violent acts will probably have some difficulty convincing a fact
finder that their prison stay has reformed them—particularly if
the acts on which their conviction was based were violent in
nature or if the facts show that they have some other history of
violence.
Finally, in states that follow the UNCHR’s requirements for
applying Article 33(2)’s “danger to the community” exception,
states should be able to show that removing the pirate is
necessary and proportionate. First, refoulement will remove the
pirate from the state, which should thereby eliminate the danger
of having him in the community. Whether refoulement is the last
resort will depend on the precise facts of the case, but the
UNHCR suggests that the state of refuge should consider
whether prosecution, restrictions on movement (such as
imprisonment), or removal to a safe third country might just as
effectively remove the danger posed by the refugee.233 Indefinite
imprisonment is certainly one option to remove the risk to the
community posed by convicted pirates, and some states have
indefinitely imprisoned some asylum seekers.234 However, and
although the UNHCR recommends it as an alternative to
removal, the drafters of the Refugee Convention apparently
assumed the indefinite imprisonment would be no better than
refoulement.235 As to the safe third country alternative, it may not
be viable because one might expect that other countries will be
unwilling to accept into their own communities pirates who have
been convicted of violent offenses.236 Finally, although each case
will have unique characteristics, the danger to the community
will likely outweigh any danger to the pirate upon being refouled.
Based on the realities of modern piracy, the facts should show
that the convicted pirate was engaged in armed acts of violence
against innocent seafarers for financial gain. This is the type of
person a fact finder should conclude may pose a great danger to
the community.

233. See UNHCR Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 215, at 7.
234. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 114 n.484 (citing HATHAWAY, supra note 119,
at 352).
235. See id.
236. Of course, if another safe country does accept the convicted pirate, then the
pirate will not be granted asylum in the state in which he was convicted.
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D. Status and Rights under the Refugee Convention
Because state laws interpreting and implementing the
Refugee Convention differ, and because states are entitled to
determine whether refugees are entitled to asylum or residence
permits, the rights accorded to any pirates who may qualify for
refugee status under the Refugee Convention will differ
depending on the laws prevailing in the state in which they are
seeking refuge.237 For example, pursuant to the EU Qualification
Directive, Member States must provide “refugees” residence
permits “which must be valid for at least three years and
renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or
public order otherwise require.”238 However, according to Article
21(3) of the EU Qualification Directive, Member States are not
required to grant residence permits to refugees who are a
“danger to the state or community” based on provisions
equivalent to those found in Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention.239 And, of course, those pirates who cannot
demonstrate persecution or who meet the Article 1(F) exclusion
criteria aimed at criminals are not entitled to any benefits
associated with refugee status. In the United States, as noted
above, because they have probably committed “serious nonpolitical crime[s]” or “particularly serious crime[s],” pirates
should not be eligible for refugee status or protection from
refoulement.240
Even if pirates are not refugees, and thus denied protections
under international refugee law, some convicted pirates,
237. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 158 (“The country of refuge has the sovereign
authority to decide on the legal status of the refugee and the rights attached to such
status.”).
238. Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification
and Status of Third-country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted,
art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. L 304/20, at 21[hereinafter EU Qualification Directive]. Member
States may provide greater benefits to refugees if they wish. For example, the United
Kingdom apparently grants five-year residence permits. See Hugo Storey, EU Refugee
Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 16 n.45 (2008).
239. Compare EU Qualification Directive, supra note 238 art. 21(2)–(3), at 20 with
Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2).
240. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–-(iii) (denying asylum to aliens who have
committed serious non-political offenses outside the United States and to aliens
convicted of particularly serious crimes); id. § 1231(b (3)(B)(ii)–-(iii) (denying
protection against refoulement to aliens who have committed serious non-political
offenses outside the United States and to aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes).
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however, may be able to seek subsidiary rights to remain or seek
protection against refoulement under international human rights
law. The question of whether pirates are likely to succeed in
establishing such rights is addressed below.
IV. ARE PIRATES LIKELY TO SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING A
RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST REFOULEMENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
With respect to the international treaties providing for
protection against refoulement under international human rights
law, most pirates should not be able to demonstrate grounds for
believing they would be subjected to torture or other forms of illtreatment if they were returned to their country of origin. As
discussed in connection with potential claims of persecution, the
evidence relating to pirates does not indicate they are individuals
who are subjected to torture or ill-treatment. Rather, pirates
commit acts of violence against innocent seafarers in the hopes
of obtaining undeserved financial rewards. In Somalia, the
evidence further indicates that it is the pirates who are in control
of the areas where pirates live and operate.241 Even if pirates
belonged to some minority clan or tribe, their claims of potential
torture or ill-treatment based on those grounds may be less than
credible given that they managed to become pirates—and thus,
the very individuals who are responsible for unprovoked, violent
acts. Furthermore, the fact that there is generalized violence or a
pattern of human rights violations in the country is ordinarily not
enough to warrant protection from refoulement under
international human rights treaties. Although such circumstances
may be considered, the individual himself will still have to show
that he personally is in danger of torture or ill-treatment.242
A. The United States Example
In the United States, convicted pirates have limited options
for seeking protection against refoulement under international
241. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 126, 171–172 and accompanying text; see also EU Qualification
Directive, supra note 238, art. 15(c), at 19 (requiring a “serious and individual threat to a
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international
or internal armed conflict” for the individual to qualify for protection under
international human rights treaty obligations (emphasis added)).
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human rights law. First, of the three international human rights
treaties described above, the United States only considers itself
subject to a non-refoulement obligation under CAT,243 which covers
only claims of torture, as opposed to ill-treatment; it is not a party
to the ECHR; and it does not agree that the ICCPR contains a
non-refoulement obligation.244 To state a claim under CAT in the
United States, the pirate would have to produce evidence
showing it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if
returned to his country of origin.245 And because the United
States is not a party to Article 22 of CAT, individuals cannot bring
complaints before the Committee against Torture.246 Therefore,
while the Committee may be able to comment on or criticize the
determinations made by US courts in cases alleging that an
individual will be tortured if refouled, the committee can make no
contrary determination.
In addition, those convicted of “particularly serious crimes”
are not only ineligible for asylum in the United States, but they
are also denied any permanent “withholding of removal” even if
they are able to show that they face torture in their country of
origin.247 Such applicants are entitled only to “deferral of
removal,”248 a status that (1) does not entitle the applicant to
lawful or permanent immigration status in the United States; (2)
permits reconsideration if the applicant is no longer subject to
likely torture; and (3) allows for the possibility of deporting the

243. Congress implemented the obligations flowing from Article 3 of CAT in the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231). FARRA states in pertinent part:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in
the United States.
Id. § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681–822.
244. See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)
(2010); Ghebrehiwot v. Attorney Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that
one applying for relief under CAT bears the burden of showing that it is more likely
than not that he would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal).
246. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 22.
247. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(2) (requiring a mandatory denial of withholding of
removal to applicants convicted of particularly serious crimes, even though they are able
to establish likely torture upon return to the country of removal).
248. See id. § 208.17(a).
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applicant to another safe third country.249 Accordingly, pirates
convicted of acts such as murder, hijacking, kidnapping, or
armed robbery would likely be denied any permanent residence
status in the United States or any permanent protection against
refoulement even if they could show they would be tortured in
some particular country of removal.250
B.

The European Union Example

Pirates convicted in Europe may not fare significantly better
than those in the United States. It is true that many countries in
Europe have joined Article 22 of CAT,251 such that individuals are
entitled to bring claims before the Committee against Torture if
they have exhausted domestic avenues for relief. Many, but for
the notable exception of the United Kingdom, are also party to
the individual complaint procedures under the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR.252 In addition, and more importantly
from a standpoint of enforcement of treaty obligations, all
Council of Europe member states (which includes all European
Union Member States) are parties to the ECHR and are
automatically subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights.253
Nevertheless, even if states may not return individuals to
states where they would be subjected to torture or ill-treatment in
violation of these several international human rights treaties,
states in Europe do not have to provide residence permits to
persons who have been convicted of serious crimes. Pursuant to
the EU Qualification Directive, Member States are not required
to grant refugee status to persons who, because they have
committed certain types of crimes, would be excludable under
the Directive’s equivalent of Article 1(F) of the Refugee
Convention.254 Nor, as noted above, are EU Member States
required to provide the benefits associated with refugee status to
refugees who pose a danger to the security of the state or who,
249. See id.. § 208.17(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iv), (b)(2).
250. See supra Part III.C (discussing what constitutes a “particularly serious crime”
in the United States).
251. For example, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
and Spain are all parties to Article 22.
252. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 148.
253. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
254. See EU Qualification Directive, supra note 238, art. 12(2), at 18.
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“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitute[] a danger to the community” of the
Member State.255 Pirates should be excludable as refugees under
the EU Qualification Directive’s provisions equivalent to Article
1(F) or excluded from refugee status benefits on the grounds
that they have been convicted of a crime that causes them to be a
danger to the community. As such, pirates should not be eligible
for the three-year residence permit that the EU Qualification
Directive requires Member States to grant to refugees.256
The EU Qualification Directive also provides for “subsidiary
protection” for persons who do not qualify for refugee status but
are otherwise deserving of international protection because they
face a real risk of serious harm—including torture, ill-treatment,
or threat to life because of indiscriminate violence—if returned
to their country of origin.257 Like refugee status, however,
subsidiary protection is not available “where there are serious
reasons for considering that” the person has (1) “committed a
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity;”
(2) “committed a serious crime;” (3) “been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as
set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations;” or (4) “constitutes a danger to the community
or to the security of the member state in which [he] is
present.”258 Under Article 17(2), persons who instigate or
otherwise participate in any of the criminal acts referenced above
are also ineligible for subsidiary protection and its associated
benefits.259 Because convicted pirates should at a minimum
qualify as having committed a “serious crime” under Article
17(1)(b), they are likely unable to qualify for subsidiary
255. See id. art. 14(4)–(5), at 18.
256. See id. art. 24(1), at 21 (requiring Member States to issue residence permits
that must be valid for at least three years and renewable to the refugee unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order require otherwise).
257. Id. art. 2(e), at 14, 15, 19. Article 15 states:
Serious harm consists of: (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the
country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or
person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or
internal armed conflict.
Id. at 19.
258. Id. art. 17(1), at 19.
259. Id. art. 17(2), at 19.
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protection in the EU—even if they are able to show that they
would be tortured or ill-treated upon return to their country of
origin. Of course, if some pirates could show they would be
tortured or ill-treated (which should be unlikely in most cases),
EU Member States would not be able to return them to a country
where that danger exists. But, since the pirates at a minimum
would have committed a serious crime under Article 17(1)(b),
states would not be required to grant them the one-year
renewable residence permit that is available to those who qualify
for subsidiary protection.260
It is true that because the EU Qualification Directive sets
minimum standards for EU Member States, some states may
provide greater protection for certain reasons and categories of
persons.261 However, because pirates are probably unable to
demonstrate substantial grounds for believing they would be
subjected to serious harm, and would likely be excluded from
claiming subsidiary status because they have committed violent
crimes, the EU Qualification Directive would not require states to
grant them residence permits.262 Whether there are options
available to allow states to remove convicted pirates from their
country in the event that the pirates can make a showing of
serious harm is discussed in the following section.
C. The Use of Internal Protection Options or Diplomatic Assurances to
Remove Any Risk of Torture or Ill-Treatment
In those cases where convicted pirates are able to prove they
would be subjected to torture or ill-treatment, states may seek to
remove the pirate and eliminate that risk of harm by using
internal flight or protection options or diplomatic assurances.
260. See id. art. 24(2), at 21.
261. See id. art. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum
standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted.”).
262. In July 2010, news reports indicated that Seychelles had passed a special law
allowing easy extradition of the pirates it convicted to Somalia. See Eleven Somali Pirates
Jailed in Seychelles, RTT NEWS, July 26, 2010, http://www.rttnews.com/
ArticleView.aspx?Id=1370247. Because a copy of the law was not made available, the
grounds on which it has predicted the extradition of convicted pirates are unknown.
Presumably, the law will comply with international refugee law and international human
rights law since Seychelles is a member of CAT, the ICCPR, and the Refugee
Convention.
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The internal flight or protection alternative is available where the
evidence shows that the risk of torture or ill-treatment is limited
to a particular part of the country, and where the individual
would be able to enter and remain in another part of the country
in which the government or an international organization would
be able to protect him against such treatment.263 Indeed, in
H.M.H.I. v. Australia,264 the Committee against Torture approved
the use of an internal protection alternative in a case in which
the individual claimed a risk of torture in Mogadishu, Somalia.
The Committee concluded that Australia could return the
individual to Kenya, where he could take advantage of the
UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program and return to a safe
area within Somalia.265 Of course, the availability of the internal
protection alternative will depend on the facts of the particular
case, and it may sometimes be difficult for states to find an
alternative safe location where a convicted pirate would be
welcome and protected.
As to diplomatic assurances that an individual will not be
tortured or ill-treated upon refoulment,266 whether assurances may
be relied on to relieve states of their obligations under
international human rights treaties to protect individuals will also
depend on the particular circumstances of the case.267 States
satisfy their human rights obligations only if the diplomatic
263. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 291–93 (discussing internal protection
under the ECHR); id. at 398–99 (discussing internal protection under the ICCPR); id. at
494–96 (discussing internal protection under CAT).
264. H.M.H.I.
v.
Australia,
No.
177/2001,
UNCAT,
U.N.
Doc.
CAT/C/28/D/177/2001, ¶ 6.6 (2002).
265. See id. In the United States, when considering applications for withholding of
removal, immigration judges are entitled to consider whether there is another location
in the country of removal where the individual is not likely to be tortured. 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(3)(ii) (2010).
266. Assurances can be written undertakings in formal agreements, such as
memoranda of understanding. Assurances can also be given less formally through
diplomatic channels. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 742.
267. See id. at 744 (noting that although the issue of diplomatic assurances has
come before the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee against Torture,
neither has adopted a general position on the practice nor condemned it outright,
preferring instead to consider the matter on a case-by-case basis); see also KALIN &
KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 497 (stating the same); Kate Jones, Deportations with Assurances:
Addressing Key Criticisms, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 183, 186 (2008) (arguing that the cases
before the European Court of Human Rights have not concluded that assurances are
inherently reliable, but rather assess whether they eliminate the risk of torture based on
the relevant facts).
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assurances on which they are relying are “(i) a suitable means to
eliminate the danger to the individual concerned, and (ii) if the
sending State may, in good faith, consider them reliable.”268
Regarding reliability, facts to consider are the general human
rights situation in the state at the relevant time269 and whether
the sending state has put in place effective means to monitor
implementation of the assurances by the receiving state.270 In
particular, the Committee against Torture recommends that in
determining whether refoulement is proper under Article 3 of
CAT, states should only rely on diplomatic assurances from states
“which do not systematically violate the Convention’s provisions,
and after a thorough examination of the merits of each
individual case.”271 It further recommends that states establish
and implement effective post-return monitoring mechanisms.272
The European Court of Human Rights similarly focuses on
the quality of the assurances and the level of monitoring in
determining whether states violate Article 3 of the ECHR by
returning applicants to areas where they allege they would be
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. For example, in Mamatkulov
v. Turkey, the court found that Turkey did not violate Article 3
when it extradited two applicants to Uzbekistan based on
diplomatic assurances from the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.273 Those assurances were contained in two letters and
stated that the applicants would not be subjected to torture or
sentenced to capital punishment and that the country would
268. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, at 9 (emphasis in
original) (citing Agiza v. Sweden, No. 233/2003, UNCAT, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, ¶¶ 13.4–13.5 (2005) and Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831).
269. See id.
270. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commn’c No. 1416/2005, UNHRC, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, ¶ 11.5 (Nov. 10, 2006) (finding assurances insufficient
where they contained no mechanism for monitoring their enforcement and where no
arrangements were otherwise made for monitoring outside the text of the assurances).
271. See UNCAT, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against
Torture: United States of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).
272. See id. The Human Rights Committee has also commented that where torture
is systematic in a country, the less likely it is that the real risk of torture can be
eliminated by diplomatic assurances. Like the Committee against Torture, it also
recommends that states adopt clear and effective mechanisms to effectively monitor the
treatment of individuals removed in accordance with diplomatic assurances. See U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
United States of America, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
273. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 322.
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abide by its obligations under CAT.274 Turkish diplomats were
also permitted to visit the applicants in prison after their
convictions and found them to be in good health.275 On the
other hand, the court has found assurances ineffective to
alleviate the risk that the applicant will be tortured where the
assurances were not specific or where they were outweighed by
other contrary evidence—such as where the practice of torture is
endemic or tolerated by the authorities.276
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding that their use has been
criticized,277 states frequently rely on diplomatic assurances.278
Assurances allow states to ensure that persons they return are not
subjected to torture or other ill-treatment. At the same time,
assurances allow states to remove persons who do not satisfy the
requirements for obtaining residence. In the United States, for
274. See id. at 303.
275. See id. at 307.
276. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/66, ¶¶ 143, 148 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28,
2008) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html (where the Tunisian
government stated in response to a request for assurances that its laws guaranteed
prisoner’s rights and that Tunisia was a member of relevant international treaties but,
such as Amnesty International reports, showed evidence of widespread torture by or
tolerated by the authorities).
277. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/60/316
(Aug. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur]. In his 2005 report to
the UN General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur strongly criticized the practice of
relying on diplomatic assurances, which he argued are unreliable and ineffective in
protecting against torture and ill-treatment. Among other things, he expressed the view
that such assurances tend to be sought from states that systematically practice torture;
that post-return monitoring mechanisms do not guarantee against torture; and that
assurances are either not legally binding or cannot be enforced by the state receiving
them. See id. ¶¶ 46, 51. States, however, have responses to these concerns. Kate Jones,
Assistant Legal Adviser at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, explains that the
UK’s policy of relying on diplomatic assurances is actually a way of ensuring that it
complies with human rights obligations, rather than avoiding them. See Jones, supra note
267, at 185–88. She notes that even though some assurances in the past have proven to
be unreliable, the United Kingdom now builds protections into its assurances—in
particular, independent monitoring arrangements. As to the fact that agreements are
with states that have poor records, she acknowledges that assurances would not be
required if there was not some question about how states would treat the returned
individuals. See id. at 186–88. Nevertheless, she suggests that it does not follow that
assurances from such states are inherently unreliable, particularly since the agreements
are made at the highest possible levels of government and failure to comply with such
political commitments could seriously damage diplomatic relations with the sending
country or subject the receiving state to negative publicity. See id. at 187–88.
278. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, at 2.
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example, reliable diplomatic assurances that a person would not
be tortured if returned to that state permit the government to
permanently remove a person whose removal otherwise would be
deferred.279
While diplomatic assurances are usually sought on an
individual basis, recently states have begun negotiating more
general agreements to the effect that the persons deported to a
particular country will not be subjected to human rights
violations (which can thereafter be supplemented by specific
assurances in the case of a particular individual). The United
Kingdom has entered into general agreements for assurances
with Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya and those agreements
typically allow for an independent human rights body to monitor
implementation of the assurances.280
Whether the European Court of Human Rights or domestic
courts will conclude that these agreements are sufficient to
ensure that deportees’ rights under Article 3 of the ECHR will
not be violated, however, is unclear.281 In an appeal by two
Libyans the United Kingdom sought to deport, the UK Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), concluded that,
although diplomatic assurances are capable of reducing a risk of
breaching Article 3 of the ECHR, even the detailed protections
contained in the agreement with Libya282 were not enough to
prevent ill-treatment.283 In particular, the SIAC expressed
concerns about the chosen monitoring body; the unreliability
and unpredictability of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadafi;
the absence of civil society to shame the government into
compliance; and the newness of the United Kingdom’s

279. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2010).
280. See Jones, supra note 267, at 184.
281. See Ashley Deeks, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Promises Not to Torture: Diplomatic
Assurances in U.S. Courts, 56–60 (Dec. 2008) (discussing litigation brought by individuals
challenging their deportation and the quality of the diplomatic assurances contained in
agreements with Algeria, Jordan, and Libya).
282. Memorandum of Understanding between the General People’s Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Co-Operation of the Great Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Provision of Assurances
in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Libya-U.K., Oct. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/libya-mou.
283. See generally DD v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] UKSIAC Nos.
SC/42/2005 & SC/50/2005 (U.K.).
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diplomatic relationship with Libya.284 By contrast, in a number of
cases brought by Algerians contesting their deportations, the
SIAC concluded that the Algerian government had negotiated
the assurances agreement with the United Kingdom in good faith
and that diplomatic pressure by the United Kingdom would help
enforce the assurances.285 The SIAC emphasized the domestic
situation in Algeria, which it noted had improved to the extent
that there was less violence and a decrease in abuses by security
forces.286
In sum, whether a state can use diplomatic assurances to aid
it in removing any pirates who do not satisfy residency
requirements (because, for example, they have been convicted of
serious crimes) but are able to establish that they face a risk of
torture in the country of removal will depend on the particular
circumstances of the case. However, assurances are certainly an
available option where the state of return is one that does not
systematically practice or condone torture. And, if the pirate’s
state of origin is one that does systematically practice torture,
states can seek to return the pirate to a neighboring state with
better practices.287 In all cases, states should be able to negotiate
diplomatic assurances that will be effective in removing the risk
of torture or ill-treatment: assurances must be specific, and the
sending state must put in place an effective post-removal
monitoring system.
CONCLUSION
The language of the relevant international treaties,
interpretations of that language, and state practice all generally
indicate that pirates who are convicted of violent crimes should
not be eligible for asylum or complementary forms of protection
against refoulement. As to refugee status under the Refugee
Convention, most pirates are probably unable to show that they
284. See id. ¶¶ 317, 319, 346, 348, 368–71.
285. See Deeks, supra note 280, at 59–60.
286. See Y v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKSIAC No. SC/36/2005, ¶
3 (U.K.).
287. It may be difficult to convince states that are not otherwise responsible for the
pirate to accept him in their community. However, many things are possible with
diplomacy. After all, as noted above, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania have all
reached agreements with a number of other countries to accept captured pirates for
jailing and prosecution. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
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would be persecuted because of their race, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular group if returned to their
country of origin. Furthermore, convicted pirates will have
committed the kinds of violent crimes that should exclude them
from refugee status and, accordingly, from being granted asylum
and the benefits associated with it, such as residence permits.
Even if pirates are not excluded from refugee status, states may
not have to protect them against refoulement under the Refugee
Convention on the grounds that they have been convicted of a
particularly serious crime that causes them to be a danger to the
community in which they are seeking refuge.
Nor should pirates generally be able to claim protection
against refoulement under the relevant international human rights
treaties. First, there is little reason to believe that most pirates
would be able to state and prove a claim that they would be
subjected to torture or ill-treatment if returned to their country
of origin. Even if some could, however, the laws of the United
States and the European Union provide that persons who have
been convicted of, or committed, certain serious crimes—like the
violent crimes pirates would have committed—are not eligible
for residence permits. Furthermore, even though such persons
cannot be refouled to face torture or ill-treatment, their deferral
of removal in the United States is only temporary, and removal
may recommence if circumstances change. Moreover, in both the
United States and Europe, states can seek reliable diplomatic
assurances with monitoring mechanisms in order to remove the
risk of torture and allow convicted pirates to be deported to their
countries of origin. If the country of origin is not an available
option, states can seek to remove pirates to other safe countries.
Accordingly, although states that convict pirates may face
additional asylum claims, and although each factual
circumstance is unique, assuming pirates have committed violent
crimes, those asylum claims are likely to be unsuccessful—at least
in terms of gaining the pirate residence in the country of
conviction.
Of course, the mere fact of additional asylum claims that
need to be investigated, considered, and adjudicated is a burden
on states. The issue of what to do with pirates who are not
eligible for residency, but who cannot be refouled because they
have been able to show they would be subjected to torture or ill-
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treatment if returned, also poses a burden on states. It may be
difficult to obtain reliable diplomatic assurances from the state of
origin, and it may also be difficult to find another safe country
willing to accept into its community a convicted pirate.
Nevertheless, the risk of asylum claims and the difficulties
associated with adjudicating them are burdens that developed
nations face in any event. During 2008, the United States granted
asylum to about 20,500 persons and resettled another 60,200
refugees from other countries.288 Canada received 34,800
applications for asylum in 2008, and granted 7550.289 The EU
Member States received 238,400 requests for asylum during
2008.290 Regarding Somalia in particular, UNHCR reports that
there were some 700,000 refugees from that country in 2009
alone.291 And, in 2008, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States received more than 3000 claims each from Somalis
seeking refuge.292 Together, the EU Member States received
approximately 14,300 requests for asylum by Somalis during
2008.293 Nations face and accept asylum claims like these because
they are developed and follow the rule of law—making them a
place where less-privileged individuals seek refuge.
Developed nations also willingly accept the risk of additional
asylum claims in fulfilling goals they otherwise view as
worthwhile. For example, states accept the risk of asylum claims
or non-refoulement claims when they engage in armed conflict and
capture prisoners. The various state military forces operating in
Afghanistan and Iraq must regularly face questions about
whether their transfer of detainees will violate the principle of
non-refoulement.294 States also seek to have foreign nationals

288. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: United States, U.S. COMM. FOR
REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS [USCRI], http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?
id=2365 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
289. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: Canada, USCRI,
http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2321 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
290. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: Europe, USCRI,
http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2327 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
291. See UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 2 (reporting that
the number of Somali asylum-seekers and refugees has jumped from approximately
485,000 in 2006 to over 700,000 by the end of 2009).
292. See World Refugee Survey 2009, USCRI, available at http://www.refugees.org/
FTP/WRS09PDFS/RefuandAsylumseek.pdf.
293. See World Refugee Survey 2009: Country Reports Europe, supra note 290.
294. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 704–05.
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extradited in order to stand trial in their country where the
foreign national has committed crimes in the country or which
affect its citizens.
Captured pirates should not be able to escape justice simply
because developed nations do not wish to deal with a relatively
few additional asylum claims. Prosecuting pirates who have
committed violent acts that disrupt international transport and
harm innocent seafarers is necessary to actually deter pirates
from continuing to commit those violent crimes.295 In the current
culture of impunity, where pirates are captured and then
released, pirates are learning that crime pays huge ransoms.
Prosecutions of more pirates can help to teach pirates a different
lesson. Developed nations generally have the resources,
institutions, and expertise to permit them to try captured pirates
in their domestic courts. They should also be able to conduct
those trials fairly and in accordance with processes that respect
human rights.296 Bringing pirates to justice and deterring future
acts of piracy is a goal at least as worthy as others which have
caused nations to consider asylum claims—a goal that developed
nations should embrace rather than seek to avoid.

295. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
296. By contrast, the solution of sending pirates to Kenya to be jailed and
prosecuted has been criticized on the grounds, among others, that Kenya has a corrupt
and slow judicial system that does not respect the human rights of its prisoners. For a
summary of some of these criticisms, see Dutton, supra note 26, at 224–26.

